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T HE YEAR 1998 MARKED THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights l and the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 2 respectively adopted on the tenth 
and ninth of December 1948. The year 1998 marked also the birth date of the 
Treaty on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court adopted 
in Rome on July 17, 1998. On this occasion, it is important to take stock of 
international law's progress, to assess how much its veneer has thickened, and 
to determine what needs to be done to make more effective its goals of preven, 
tion and control. Since most of the world's victimization occurs in violation 
of international law's proscriptions against war crimes, crimes against human, 
ity, and genOcide, this article will deal with the weaknesses of the normative 
framework of these three jus cogens crimes. My purpose is to eliminate, or at 
least substantially narrow, the legal loopholes through which the perpetrators 
of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide are 'able, with impunity, 
An earlier version of this article was published in 8 TRANSNAT'L L & CONT. PROB 199 
(1998). 
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to escape accountability for their international crimes and Widespread viola~ 
tions of fundamental human rights. 
International humanitarian law is that body of norms that protects certain 
categories of persons and property and prohibits attacks against them during 
the course of armed conflicts be they of an international or non~international 
character} These norms derive from conventional and customary interna~ 
tionallaw which are respectively referred to as the "Law of Geneva" (for the 
conventional law of armed conflicts) and the "Law of The Hague" (for the cus~ 
tomary law of armed conflicts). The "Law of The Hague" is not, however, ex~ 
clusively customary law because it is in part treaty law and the "Law of Geneva" 
is also not exclusively treaty law because it includes customary law. Thus, the 
traditional distinction between conventional q.nd customary law is substan~ 
tially eroded. Additionally, the treaty law that applies to weapons derives from 
customary as well as conventional law, and some of its, specific norms have be~ 
come part of customary law. In sum, in the las,t one hundred years, the evolu~ 
tion of the dual sources of interna~ionaf humanitarian law, namely 
conventional and customary law, have become so intertwined aI].d so overlap~ 
ping that they can be said to be two sides of the same coin. The nomenclature 
the "Law of Geneva" and the "Law of The Hague" is therefore only a useful 
shorthand label. 
In addition to this historic dual~track evoh;ll:ibn of the law of armed conflicts, 
two additional developments have expanded the general scope of the term 
"international humanitarian law," namely, the 'proscriptions against crimes 
against humanity4and genocide.s The first originated as an outgrowth of 
war crimes even though it subsequently eVQl'{ed into a distinct category of in~ 
ternational crimes; the second, though originally intended to encompass 
crimes against humanity, also evolved intQ a distinct and separate category of 
international crimes. The norms contained in these three major ir:tternational 
crimes-war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide-have become 
part of jus cogens.6 Deriving from multiple legal sources, they overlap relative to 
their context, content, purpose, scope, application, perpetrators, and protected 
interests.7 
These norms also contain certain ambiguities and gaps, the existence of 
which is due essentially to two factors. The first is the haphazard evolution of 
international criminal law . 8 The second is that governments, which control the 
international legislative processes, are not, for a variety of reasons, though 
mostly for political reasons, desirous of eliminating the overlaps, closing the 
gaps, and removing the ambiguities9-not a surprising fact given that two of 
the three categories of crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, occur 
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with deliberate State action or policy, and that governments are not particu~ 
larly inclined to criminalize the conduct of their high officials.10 War crimes 
can also be a product of State action or policy, but frequently are committed by 
individual combatants acting on their own, which probably explains why there 
is less reluctance to criminalize this type of individual criminal conduct. 11 
Crimes against humanity and genocide are essentially crimes of State, as are 
sometimes war crimes, because they need the substantial involvement of State 
organs, including the army, police, paramilitary groups, and the State's bureau~ 
cracy.12 These crimes generate significant victimization and must be strenu~ 
ously deterred. Nevertheless, governments are reluctant to remove the 
ambiguities in the relevant normative provisions applicable to crimes against 
humanity and genocide, and to fill the existing gaps in these proscriptions.13 
The individual criminal responsibility of soldiers and others in the lower eche~ 
Ions of State power is much more easily accepted by governments than that of 
political leaders and senior government officials and, as well, those in the gov~ 
ernmental bureaucracy who carry out, execute, and facilitate the policies and 
practices of crimes against humanity, genocide, and even war crimes. Indeed, 
the articulation' of relevant international norms effectively shields them from 
criminal responsibility; existing international norms of criminal responsibility 
relative to crimes against humanity, crimes of genocide, and even war crimes, 
are too ambiguous to reach effectively into this category of violators. This ren~ 
ders their prosecution virtually impossible. 
Since World War II, there have been an estimated 250 conflicts of an inter~ 
national, non~international, and purely internal legal character. The estimates 
of the resulting casualties reach as high as 170 million. 14 Most of that victimiza~ 
tion occurred at the hands of tyrannical regimes and by non~State actors during 
internal conflicts. This tragic new dimension in world victimization requires a 
reexamination of international humanitarian law to make it unambiguously 
applicable to non~State actors, and to reconcile their overlapping application, 
fill in their gaps, and clarify their ambiguities so as to render their enforcement 
sufficiently effective to prevent, deter, and punish the perpetrators of such 
crimes. This article discusses these questions. 
Crimes Against Humanity 
Crimes against humanity originated after World War J15 in the concept of 
"crimes against the laws of humanity," a term found in the Preamble to the 
1907 Hague Convention.16 
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Until a more complete code oflaws of war has been issued, the High Contracting 
Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the 
Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under 
the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result 
from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, 
and from the dictates of the public conscience.!7 
After the war, in 1919, the Allies established a Commission to investigate 
war crimes 18 which thereafter found that the killing of Armenians by the Turks 
around 191519 constituted "crimes against the laws of humanity." The United 
States and Japan strongly objected to the concept and insisted on having their 
dissenting positions reflected in the Report.2o In 1923, after the failure of ratifi~ 
cation of the 1919 Treaty ofSevres,21 which required that the Turkish govern~ 
ment tum over to the Allies those responsible for such crimes, the Treaty of 
Lausanne22 excluded such a provision and a protocol was attached, giving am~ 
nesty to the Turks who had committed the crime irrespective of whether they 
acted as State actors or non~State actors.23 By 1942, the Allies realized that 
they would have to revisit that crime,24 and in 1945 the London Charter pro~ 
vided, in Article 6(c), for the prosecution of those who committed "crimes 
against humanity:" 
Crimes against humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian 
populations, before or during the war; or persecutions on political, racial or 
religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of 
the country where perpetrated.25 
But that article linked Article 6 (c) crimes to "crimes against peace" (the initia~ 
tion and conduct of war) as defined in Article 6(a) and to "war crimes" as de~ 
fined in Article 6 (b). This meant that all "crimes against humanity" committed 
before the initiation of the war, between 1932 and 1939, were not 
prosecutable.26 
The war~connecting link was removed in a 1950 Report of the International 
Law Commission (ILC). 27 The question that remained, however, was the le~ 
gaIly binding effect of such a report.28 On its face, a report of the ILC has no 
binding effect, unless it is deemed to be the embodiment of customary interna~ 
tionallaw, in which case the ILC report can be seen as the progressive codifica~ 
tion of customary international law and therefore binding as to its content. 
However, the practice of States remains an important element in addition to 
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the element of opi7lD juris to establish customary internationallaw,29 and this 
practice seems to be somewhat wanting because there are few States that have 
prosecuted persons for such crimes.30 Moreover, no convention on crimes 
against humanity has been developed since 1945,31 even though many other 
conventions on various international crimes have been adopted since that 
time.32 There is no rational explanation for this gap other than the lack of po~ 
litical will by governments. 
The next opportunity to reaffirm the London Charter's "crimes against hu~ 
manity" arose in 1993 when the Security Council adopted the Statute of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICfY).33 In this 
statute, however, the connection to an armed conflict was preserved34 with 
Article 5 requiring that "crimes against humanity" take place in the context of 
"an armed conflict" of an international or internal character. The difference 
between the war~connecting link of the London Charter's Article 6 (c) and the 
ICfY's Article 5 is the addition in Article 5 of a conflict of an internal 
character. 
In 1994, however, when the same Security Council adopted the Statute for 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),35 it did not include 
any war~connection whatsoever.36 Why the change? One explanation is that 
the ICfY's formulators sought to preserve the London Charter's requirement, 
though expanding it to internal conflicts, to offset arguments that Article 5 of 
the ICfY departed from existing customary law.37 Since there was no conven~ 
tion on crimes against humanity, that category of crimes had to be deemed as 
falling within customary law.38 But with respect to the ICTR, the Government 
of Rwanda was not expected to challenge the absence of such a requirement.39 
To have included such a war~connecting requirement in the ICTR statute 
would have meant that prosecutions for such crimes would have been impossi~ 
ble because that conflict was purely interna1.40 
An examination of the contents of crimes against humanity as defined in 
Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter reveals that it covers the following acts: 
"murder, extermination, enslavement, imprisonment, deportation or other in~ 
humane acts," and "persecution".41 The ICfY and ICTR added "rape" for 
specificity.42 However, the ICTR also added the restrictive requirement not 
present in the ICfY; that the acts constituting the crime must be the result of 
"widespread or systematic" practices.43 Furthermore, some of the terms used in 
the London Charter's Article 6(c), the ICfY's Article 5, and the ICTR's Arti~ 
cle 3 may be deemed to lack sufficient specificity to satisfy the "principles ofle~ 
gality" required in the world's major legal systems.44 For example, "other 
inhumane acts" can be deemed vague, "murder" overlaps with "extermination," 
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and "imprisonment" and "deportation" can be lawful. Of course, careful judi, 
cial interpretation can avoid such vagueness and ambiguity, but that presup, 
poses the existence of a judicial process that can develop a clear and precise 
jurisprudence, and in that respect much is expected from the ICTY and ICfR. 
Another issue concerning "crimes against humanity" is whether it is essen' 
tially a category of mass victimization crimes, which is predicated on the exis, 
tence of State,action or State,policy, or whether it is but a catch,all category 
for mass crimes even when committed by non,State actors.45 The formulation of 
Article 6 (c) raises that issue relative to whether "persecution" is a required pol, 
icy element or simply another genre of the specific crimes listed in Article 6 (c), 
or indeed, whether it is both a specific type of prohibited act as well as a policy 
element applicable to State and non,State actors alike.46 In this writer's judg, 
ment, "crimes against humanity" as set forth in Article 6 (c) is no mere catch,all 
category for mass victimization, but rather a category of international crimes, 
distinguishable from other forms of mass victimization by the jurisdictional pol, 
icy element of a "State action or policy." But when the ICfR's Article 3 was 
made to qualify Article 6 (c)'s policy of persecution by the addition of the terms 
"widespread or systematic,"47 the drafters, while doubtless seeking to tailor the 
definition of "crimes against humanity" to the Rwandan conflict, brought 
about a progressive development. This is evidenced in the disjunctive "or" as 
opposed to the conjunctive "and." If the mass victimization can be only "wide, 
spread" and not also "systematic," then it can be the spontaneous conseque'nce 
of a given conflict48 and not necessarily a reflection of "State action or policy." 
The statute of the ICC adopted in Rome on July 17, 1998, follows the 
ICfR's precedent in that it states in its Article 7 that" [f] or the purpose of this 
statute, 'crimes against humanity' means any of the following acts when com, 
mitted as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian 
population with knowledge of the attack ... "49 At the same time, the ICC Stat, 
ute's Article 7 (h) make~ "persecution" specifically prohibited conduct;50 and 
while it is one of the forms of carrying out an "attack directed against any civil, 
ian population," the persecution of a group of persons is by its very nature possi, 
ble only as a consequence of State action or policy carried out by State actors or 
non,State actors, or the product of policy carried out by non,State actors. In 
fact, most of the specific crimes listed within the meaning of this definition can 
occur only as a result of State action or policy carried out by State actors or 
non,State actors: " (b) extermination; (c) enslavement; (d) deportation or forc, 
ible transfer of population; ... G) the crime of Apartheid." 51 The other specifi, 
cally listed crimes presumably can be committed by individuals without the 
existence of State action or policy. But clearly if such crimes are directed against 
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a "civilian population," they are necessarily the product of State action or pol, 
icy carried out by State actors or the product of policy of non,State actors. 
These specific crimes are: 
(a) murder; ... (e) imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty 
in violation of fundamental rules of international law; (f) torture; (g) rape, sexual 
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, 
or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; . . . (0 enforced 
disappearance of persons; ... (k) other inhumane acts of a similar character 
intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or 
physical health.52 
Thus, the element of State policy for State actors and that of policy for 
non,State actors is dominant throughout this latest definition of "crimes 
against humanity." 
The element of State action or policy is not the only distinguishing interna, 
tional jurisdictional characteristic of crimes against humanity;53 it carries with 
it also certain implications concerning the criminal responsibility of a State's 
agents who contribute to the overall execution of the State's plan or policy. 
Thus, if it is established that a State has developed a policy, or carried out a 
plan, or engaged in acts whose outcomes include the crimes contained in the 
definition of crimes against humanity, then those persons in the bureaucratic 
apparatus who brought about, or contributed to, that result could be charged 
with complicity to commit crimes against humanity. Further those who in, 
tended to carry out the policy could be charged with the commission of that 
crime, or at least, with complicity to commit that crime.54 The responsibility of 
State agents arises in this case irrespective of whether their conduct was lawful 
under national law. However, it is important to note that the policy element, 
\vhether developed or carried out by State actors or non,State actors, is the ju, 
risdictional element that makes "crimes against humanity" a category of inter, 
national crimes and that distinguishes it from other forms of mass victimization 
which othenvise are within national criminal jurisdiction. On June 30, 2000, 
the Preparatory Commission adopted the Elements of Crimes55 for the three 
ICC crimes.56 
Between the Nuremberg formulation of Article 6 (c) in 1945 and the ICTR's 
formulation of Article 3 in 1994, "crimes against humanity" have shifted from a 
category of crimes applicable only to situations involving State policy or action 
to situations involving non,State actors. This shift has been evidenced in the 
ICTR and ICC Statutes which provide the requirements of "widespread or sys, 
tematic" and "attack against any civilian population." The combination of the 
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two requirements makes the crime applicable to both State and non,State ac, 
tors; and also applicable in time of peace and war, without any connecting link 
to the initiation or conduct of war or to war crimes. 
Other than these two formulations, "crimes against humanity" never have 
been the subject of a specialized international convention, thus leaving some 
doubt as to some of the specific contents of that category of international 
crimes and as to their applicability to non,State actors.57 This is evident in the 
eleven international instruments that have been elaborated between 1907 and 
1998 and that define, in different though similar ways, "crimes against human, 
ity." Thus, "crimes against humanity" remain part of customary law, with a 
mixed baggage of certainty as to some of its elements, and uncertainty as to 
others and to their applicability to non,State actors. 
A textual comparison of these formulations evidences the differences be, 
tween them. It also evidences the overlap that exists between genocide and war 
crimes relative to the protected targets and prohibited conduct. 
Genocide 
In defining protected groups the Convention on the Prevention and Punish, 
ment of the Crime of Genocide, specifies only three, namely: national, ethnic, 
and religious groups: This enumeration excludes political and social groups, 58 
an omission that was no accident. The Convention was elaborated in 1948, 
and at that time the USSR was not desirous of having political and social 
groups included in those being given protection because Stalin and his regime 
already had begun their purges which targeted these very groups.59 As a conse' 
quence of this omission, the killing of an estimated one million persons in Cam' 
bodia by the Khmer Rouge between 1975 and 1985, almost forty percent of the 
population, can be argued to have not constituted genocide because the perpe, 
trators and victims were of the same ethnic group and because the targeted vic, 
tim group was a political group which is not covered by the Convention.60 
This gap in the Genocide Convention is well, known, but at no time since 
1948 has there been any effort to fill it. In fact, three opportunities were never 
seized. The Statutes of the IC1Y61 in 1993 and the ICTR62 in 1994 were 
adopted with the same formulation as Article II of the Genocide Convention. 
Later, in connection with the elaboration of the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, the Preparatory Committee failed to support any changes to 
Article II of the Genocide Convention.63 
As stated, the Genocide Convention protects three groups, national, ethnic, 
and religious.64 It also specifies that there must be a specific "~ntent to destroy 
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[the protected group] in whole or in part. "65 This requirement makes it appear 
that the criminal responsibility befalls essentially those who plan, initiate, or 
carry out the policy that is specifically intended to produce the result of de, 
stroying the protected group "in whole or in part," and leaves open the ques, 
tions of the responsibility of those in the lower echelons of the execution of 
such a policy and the legal standards required to prove it.66 The requirement of 
specific intent in the criminal laws of most legal systems is more difficult to 
prove than that of general intent. General intent can be proven inferentially by 
the legal standard of what the ordinary reasonable person would have known 
under existing circumstances.67 This difficulty is especially true of lower eche, 
Ions of executors where typically there exists no "paper trail." But to prove spe, 
cific intent by higher echelons may also be arduous if there is no paper trail. 
The reason is that the Genocide Convention was drafted with the Nazi experi, 
ence in mind; the Germans, who were meticulous in everything, left behind a 
detailed paper trail.68 But this situation never has been repeated. In the Yugo, 
slav69 and Rwandan 70 conflicts, for example, a paper trail, if it exists, has yet to 
be found, and it may never be made public by those who have the information.71 
The same is true of other conflicts such as Cambodia.72 There are, moreover, 
conflicts where a paper trail exists but has not been made public. 73 
In addition to the issue of specific genocidal intent, which is fraught with ev, 
identiary difficulties, there is the question of whether the protected group can 
be identified differently. For example, can it be based on gender, or limited to a 
group in a given area? The Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Se, 
curity Council Resolution 780 (1992), which investigated violations of inter, 
national humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia, concluded that these two 
questions can be answered in the positive.74 In the French trial of Papon who 
was convicted on April 2, 1998 of complicity for "crimes against humanity" as 
defined in French criminallaw,75 the central issue, where "genocide" was fre, 
quently referred to though the charge was only "crimes against humanity," was 
how to prove complicity in these types of crimes by agents of the State. When a . 
person charged is a bureaucrat operating in a large bureaucracy,76 it is so far un, 
clear how individual criminal responsibility can be established for such a person 
where no specific criminal act is accomplished, but whose administrative func, 
tion aids in the ultimate conduct.77 These questions remain unanswered by the 
norms applicable both to "genocide" and to "crimes against humanity." 
Lastly, a question arises as to "genocide," and that is the nature and size of 
the "group" targeted for elimination "in whole or in part." Is it the entire group 
as it exists in the world, or a smaller portion of that group which is identified 
and targeted by the perpetrators? Could it be, for example, that portion of. 
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the group that inhabits a certain area, or a given town, or a segment of that 
group such as the intellectuals or the women in that group? That was the issue 
that faced the Commission of Experts78 in determining whether "ethnic 
cleansing"79 could be deemed a form of genocide. Similarly, the issue arose with re~ 
spect to the policy of systematic rape of the women of a certain identifiable group.80 
The Genocide Convention lc:!~ves these questions unanswered, but it would 
be valid to consider the Convention as susceptible of progressive interpretation 
in light of the new techniques that nefarious planners devise to achieve their 
evil goals. The Genocide Convention justifies an evolving interpretation that 
fulfills its goals and purposes.81 
Since 1948, "genocide," as defined in the Genocide Convention,82 has been 
embodied in three international instruments, to wit, the statutes of the 
ICTY,83 ICTR,84 and the Statute of the International Criminal Court,85 and 
the incorporation of Article II of the Genocide Convention into these three in~ 
struments has been without change.86 Accordingly, none of the problems evi~ 
dent since 1948 have been addressed to date. 
The ICC Statute, Article 6, basically adopted the Genocide Convention's 
formulation with almost no change,87 except that of combining in one article 
the provisions contained in Articles 2 and 3 of the Genocide Convention. 
War Crimes 
The regulation of armed conflicts has two sources: (1) conventional law, 
also referred to as the "Law of Geneva," consisting of the four Geneva conven~ 
tions of 194988 plus two additional protocols of 197789 relating to "conflicts of 
an international character" and to "conflicts of a non~international character;" 
and (2) customary law, also referred to as the "Law of The Hague," which refers 
to the customary practices of States.90 
As stated above, however, the "Law of The Hague" is not exclusively cus~ 
tomary law because it is in part treaty law and the "Law of Geneva" is also not 
exclusively treaty law because it incorporates customary law. Thus, the tradi~ 
tional distinction between conventional and customary law is substantially 
eroded. Additionally, the treaty law that applies to weapons derives from both 
customary and conventional law, and that body of treaty law, as well as some of 
its specific norms, has become part of customary law. Customary law, however, 
is binding only on the States that share in the custom and that expr~ss their will 
to be bound by it unless it becomes a general custom that is binding on all 
States. Consequently, States that do not follow the custom, unless it is a general 
custom, are not bound by it as a legal obligation. Nevertheless, a custom can 
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rise to such a level of general acceptance that it may become binding even on 
those States that do not share in the custom or that may express their will not 
to be bound by it. This applies to those general customs that rise to a higher 
level of acceptance and which reflect a universal sense of opprobrium, namely 
jus cogens or a peremptory norm of internationallaw.91 Among the interna, 
tional crimes that fall within this category are: aggression, genocide, "crimes 
against humanity," war crimes, slavery and slave,related practices, torture, and 
piracy. In time, other international crimes92 may rise to that level and be 
deemed jus cogens crimes. 
In 1899 and then again in 1907, the customary law of armed conflicts was 
"codified" in the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War 
on LandY3 But that codification was applicable only to States and only when a 
conflict was between States-in other words, a "conflict of an international 
character," as that term was developed subsequently in the 1949 Geneva Con, 
ventions. Contrary to general belief, the 1907 Hague Convention did not es, 
tablish the principle of individual criminal responsibility for the enunciated 
violations, but only the principle of compensation, which was incumbent upon 
the violating State. It was only in time, starting with the aftermath of World 
War I, but more particularly in the aftermath of World War II, that the princi, 
pIes of individual criminal responsibility, and of command responsibility under 
international law, were made part of customary law.94 
In addition to this original customary law of armed conflicts, a number of in, 
ternational instruments have been executed. Most of these cover the use or 
prohibition of use of certain weapons in time of war, the prohibition of certain 
weapons at all times, and the prohibition of emplacement of weapons in certain 
places at any time;95 as well as the protection from destruction and pillage of 
cultural property in the time of war.96 There is a divergence of views among 
governments and experts as to which of these treaties rise to the level of a gen, 
eral custom and which do not. Nevertheless, a general custom has evolved 
from the cumulative effect of these treaties that weapons that "cause unneces, 
sary pain and suffering" are prohibited even though what these weapons are is 
still the subject of debate.97 
The "Law of Geneva" (four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and portions of 
Protocols I and II which embody customary law) are also deemed to have risen 
to the level of a general custom.98 They are therefore binding on all States irre, 
spective of whether a given State has or has not ratified one of them.99 But it 
should be noted that some States maintain that not all of Protocols I and II cod, 
ify customary international law and therefore some of their provisions are still 
deemed to be part of conventional law which is applicable only to States parties. 
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As a result, there is an overlap in the binding legal effect of these conventions 
since they are first binding on their signatories, then also binding on the same sig, 
atories and on all other States because they are part of customary law. But some 
governments, like the United States, argue that only portions of Protocols I and II, 
which the United States has not yet ratified, have risen to the level of a gen, 
eral custom. Selecting what is and what is not part of custom is not only a chal, 
lenging legal exercise, but one that is fraught with political considerations. 100 
As earlier noted, the "Law of Geneva" is divided into two categories: (1) 
"conflicts of an international character" where violations (war crimes) are re, 
ferred to as "grave breaches"lOl-well defined, but applicable only to armed 
conflicts taking place between States; and (2) "conflicts of a non,international 
character" where violations are not referred to as "grave breaches"-involving 
a foreign element, according to some, but applicable mainly to armed conflicts 
between a State and a belligerent or insurgent group within that State. There 
are, therefore, two regimes applicable to war crimes within the "Law of 
Geneva:" the "grave breaches" regime of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 
and Protocol I, in addition to the "violations" regime of common Article 3 of 
the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Protocol II. Within the first "grave 
breaches" regime, war crimes are not limited to "grave breaches" but extend to 
other transgressions of norms contained in these codifications which also in, 
corporate customary law. Within the second "violations" regime there is linger, 
ing reluctance to consider all the transgressions of norms contained in Protocol 
II as war crimes. In that regime, "violations" of common Article 3 are deemed 
war crimes and require no foreign element to make common Article 3 applica, 
ble; but, Protocol II, which applies to this regime, precludes the application of 
common Article 3 to conflicts between dissident groups within a given State. 
Thus, the two regimes of the "Law of Geneva" exclude most of those conflicts 
that may be deemed purely internal conflicts, including tyrannical regime vic, 
timization, even though these types of conflicts have caused most of the world's 
wartime victimization since World War II. 
As noted, conflicts of a "non, international character" are regulated in the 
1949 Geneva Conventions by a single article, common to all four conven, 
tions-common Article 3.102 Protocol II expands upon common Article 3103 
relative to what that article deems to be "violations" and not "grave breaches." 
But, common Article 3 and Protocol II are limited in scope and do not have the 
specificity or detail contained in the articles defining "grave breaches." The 
"grave breaches" contained in common Articles 50, 51, DO, and 147 of the 
1949 Geneva Conventions embrace nine categories of war crimes: 
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1. wilful killing (I-IV Conventions); 
2. torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments (I-IV 
Conventions) ; 
3. Wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health (I-IV 
Conventions) ; 
4. extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by 
military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly (I, II, and IV 
Conventions) ; 
5. compelling a prisoner of war or a protected person to serve in the forces of 
the hostile Power (III and IV Conventions); 
6. wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or a protected person of the rights of fair 
and regular trial prescribed in the Convention (III and IV Conventions); 
7. unlawful deportation or transfer of a protected person (IV Convention); 
8. unlawful confinement of a protected person (IV Convention); and 
9. taking of hostages (IV Convention). 
To be considered a "grave breach," each of the categories listed above must be 
committed against persons or property protected by the relevant conventions. 
Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions does not categorically 
establish that "violations" of that provision are war crimes, but scholars have 
interpreted common Article 3 violations as constituting war crimes. 104 Article 
4(2) of Protocol II, expanding on Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions, 
provides; 
\Vithout prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the following acts against 
the persons referred to in paragraph 1 are and shall remain prohibited at any time 
and in any place whatsoever: 
(a) violence to the life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in 
particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any 
form of corporal punishment; 
(b) collective punishments; 
(c) taking of hostages; 
(d) acts of terrorism; 
(e) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault; 
(£) slavery and the slave trade in all their forms; 
(g) pillage; and 
(h) threats to commit any of the foregOing acts. 
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Cognate provisions 105 further provide that certain fundamental protections 
be observed: (1) humane treatment for detained persons, such as protection 
from violence, torture, and collective punishment; (2) protection from inten~ 
tional attack, hostage~taking, and acts of terrorism of persons who take no part 
in hostilities; (3) special protection for children to provide for their safety and 
education and to preclude their participation in hostilities; (4) fundamental 
due process for persons against whom sentences are to be passed or penalties 
executed; (5) protection and appropriate care for the sick and wounded, and 
medical units which assist them; and (6) protection of the civilian population 
from military attack, acts of terror, deliberate starvation, and attacks against 
installations containing dangerous forces. However, Article 4(2) of Protocol II 
is narrow in scope: (1) it applies only to internal conflicts in which dissident armed 
groups are under responsible command and exercise control over such a part of 
the national territory as to carry out sustained and concerted military opera~ 
tions; (2) it has the effect of excluding many internal conflicts in which dissi~ 
dent armed groups occupy no significant territory but conduct sporadic guerrilla 
operations over a wide area; (3) it does not guarantee all the protections of the 
Conventions for international armed conflicts, e.g., prisoner-of~war treatment for 
captured combatants; and (4) it does not contain provisions to punish offend~ 
ers-non~international conflicts are not covered by the definition of "grave 
breaches" contained in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and its Protocol!. 
The essential differences between the explicit obligations arising from the 
two normative regimes deemed "grave breaches" and "violations" arise with re~ 
spect to the duties and rights associated with their enforcement. For "grave 
breaches" the duties are: (1) to investigate; (2) to prosecute; (3) to extradite; and 
(4) to assist through judicial cooperation of investigations; and the rights in~ 
clude (1) the right for any State to rely on universal jurisdiction to investigate, 
prosecute and punish; (2) the non~applicability in national or international 
processes of statutes oflimitationsj106 (3) the non~applicability of the defense of 
"obedience to superior orders;" 107 and (4) the non~applicability of immunities 
including that of Head ofState.108 The same duties and rights are not explicit 
relative to "violations" of common Article 3, and thus a normative gap exists 
with respect to the enforcement consequences that arise out of transgressions 
of these two regimes. 109 There is, however, a notable trend among legal experts 
to consider such formalism as historically de passe and to consider the same en~ 
forcement consequences applicable to both legal regimes. 
The formal distinctions discussed above, and the gaps that exist in their 
scope, application, protection, and enforcement, are no longer tenable. The 
"writings of the most distinguished publicists" 110 agree that there should be no 
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distinctions between "grave breaches" and "violations" of common Article 3 
and Protocol II; they agree that both contain equally enforceable prohibitions 
carrying the same enforcement consequences. II I They do so at least in part be, 
cause the overwhelming majority of post' World War II conflicts have been of a 
"non, international character,"112 and because these conflicts have produced 
an overwhelming number of victims. As noted above, there have been, since 
World War II, some 250 conflicts and internal tyrannical regime victimizations 
that have produced an estimated 170 million casualties. l13 Thus, to maintain a 
distinction between these two legal regimes and their enforcement conse, 
quences ignores the purpose of these regimes, which is to protect innocent vic, 
tims from harm. 
For purposes of war crimes, however, the distinction between types of con' 
flicts and the legal regimes applicable to them does not apply with respect to 
crimes against humanity and genocide. These two categories of crimes are 
deemed applicable in time of peace as well as in time of war. The most signifi, 
cant problems arising out of overlaps and gaps in the law of armed conflict are 
the legal standards applicable in distinguishing between conflicts of an interna, 
tional and non' international character, and in ascertaining the relevant parts 
of conventional and customary law of armed conflicts applicable to these con' 
texts, considering that the two sets of norms mirror one another. I 14 Another 
layer of confusion originates in doctrines of international law from which im, 
provident extrapolations are made into the law of armed conflicts; legal inter, 
pretation and analysis of these two overlapping areas are thus frequently more 
confusing than they are elucidating. 
The foregoing observations were evidenced in two related judgments by the 
ICfY. The first was in connection with the Tadic jurisdictional appeal case. 115 
Commenting on that judgment Professor Meron notes: 
The appeals chamber's expansive interpretation that "laws or customs of war" in 
Article 3 of the Tribunal's Statute reach noninternational armed conflicts largely 
avoided the worst possible consequences. However, the chamber refused to use 
Article 3 of its Statute (laws and customs of war) as a conduit to bring in as 
customary law conduct comprising grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions 
(grave breaches are the subject of Article 2 of the Statute; these can be regarded 
as customary law whose content parallels the pertinent provisions of these 
Conventions). The grave breaches are the principal crimes under the 
Conventions. Thus deprived of the core of international criminal law in cases 
deemed to be noninternational, the Tribunal can only raise the level of 
actionable violations to crimes against humanity and perhaps, in the future, 
genocide. Not only does this handicap the Tribunal's ability to carry out its 
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mandate, but some commentators also criticize the resort to such heavy artillery 
against evil, but relatively minor, actors. Disregarding considerations of judicial 
economy, the appeals chamber has therefore enabled the creation of a crazy quilt 
of norms that would be applicable in the same conflict, depending on whether it 
is characterized as international or noninternational. No less, the potential for 
unequal and inconsistent treatment of the accused is great. Fortunately, until 
T adic, the decisions of the trial chambers on indictments pursuant to Article 61 
of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure and Evidence found that the situations 
involved international armed conflicts and that the grave breaches provisions 
were therefore applicable, avoiding potential chaos.1l6 
Meron then further notes that the decision was not inevitable, as the proposi-
tion that the fighting was part of an international armed conflict-a proposi-
tion advanced by the Commission of Experts, the U.S. Government, and many 
scholars-was a position known to the majority of the appeals chamber though 
one they chose not to adopt. Further, Meron notes, Judge Georges Abi-Saab 
proposed terming the fighting as part of non-international armed conflicts, but 
including "grave breaches" within the applicable customary law)17 
The fact remains, however, that the ICTY eschewed this reasoning. Worse, 
the subsequent T adic judgment on the merits erroneously applied another in-
ternationallaw standard to the issue presented. IIB In that decision, the T adic 
majority erroneously applied the international law standard of State responsi-
bility to determine whether a conflict is or is not of an international character. 
In so doing, the Tribunal relied on the opinion of the International Court of 
Justice in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua 
v. U.S.).119 The Court, however, failed to appreciate that the agency relation-
ship needed to establish State responsibility, essentially for the purposes of civil 
damages, is distinguishable from the legal standard required to establish 
whether a given conflict is of an international or non-international character. 
Meron, aptly commenting on this confusion, writes: 120 
[The Tadic case] was not an issue of (state) responsibility at all. Identifying the 
foreign intervenor was relevant to characterizing the conflict .... Conceptually 
... [the Nicaragua test] cannot determine whether a conflict is international or 
internal. In practice, applying the Nicaragua test to the question in Tadic 
produces artificial and incongruous conclusions. 
Indeed, even a quick perusal ofinternationallaw literature would establish that 
imputability is not a test commonly used in judging whether a foreign interven-
tion leads to the internationalization of the conflict and the applicability of 
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those rules of international humanitarian law that govern armed conflicts of an 
international character. 
This decision led several government experts at the ICC Diplomatic Con, 
ference to express their fear that, unless the war crimes provision of Article 8 
was clearly and unambiguously drafted, judges may, in the future, interpret Ar, 
ticle 8 in a confusing or expansive manner, and thus create new law by judicial 
fiat. Such concern for strict judicial interpretation did not however produce 
the desired lack of ambiguity. On the contrary, it gave, in my opinion, more op, 
portunities for non, strict interpretative approaches. 
Thus, in these two judgments, which are the first of an international juris' 
diction since the close of World War II and the subsequent proceedings at 
Nuremburg121 and in the Far East,122 we find more confusion than clarity re, 
garding the following issues: 
A. Generally 
1. What norms of conventional law of armed conflicts have become 
part of customary law, and how is that evidenced? 
2. What norms of customary law have been codified in conventional 
law, and how is that evidenced? 
B. Specifically 
1. Does customary law include all the "grave breaches" of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions? 
2. Does customary law include all or some of the "grave breaches" of 
Protocol I, and, if so, which ones? 
3. Does customary law include common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions? 
4. Does customary law include all or some of the provisions of Protocol 
II, and, if so, which ones? 
5. What other treaties on the regulation of armed conflicts, 
particularly those concerning the prohibition and use of certain weapons, 
have become part of customary law, J23and on what basis? 
C. Legal Standards 
1. Are the standards applicable to State responsibility applicable also 
to the determination of whether a conflict is of an international or 
non, international character; and, if applicable, is it exclusively applicable 
or simply applicable as one of several legal standards? 
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2. Is the determination of the nature of a given armed conflict based 
on one or more standards deemed part of customary law, and, if so, to 
what extent does customary law rely on legal standards that derive 
from: 
(a) Common Article 3 of the 1949 Conventions; and 
(b) Protocol II. 
These and other questions still loom large in the law of armed conflicts; and, as 
stated above, they were reflected in the range of governmental positions on the 
definition of war crimes in the draft statute of the ICC.124 
In 1995, the United Nations General Assembly established an Ad Hoc Com~ 
mittee for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court.125 In 1996, it 
established a Preparatory Committee for an International Criminal Court.126 
Subsequently, during three'and'a~half,years of deliberations, the question 
of defining war crimes became the subject of detailed discussions. Questions 
were raised, in particular, about whether all of the contents of Protocols I and 
II have risen to the level of customary law, about the specific contents of 
customary law, and still more particularly, about the rules governing conflicts 
of a non-international character and the prohibitions of the use of certain 
weapons in all categories of conflicts. While there was no dispute that 
the "grave breaches" provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions are appli, 
cable, and substantial agreement that most of the "grave breaches" in Protocol 
I are included, there was less agreement that some of the Protocol II prohi, 
bitions can be deemed part of custom. In fact, the texts proposed, and the one 
adopted reflect, a partial regression from the norms contained in Protocol I 
and a substantial regression from the norms contained in Protocol II. The draft 
provision submitted to the diplomatic conference evidences these diver, 
gent views.127 The chart was developed and circulated at the Preparatory 
Committee for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court128 and, in 
setting forth the various sources for the provisions, highlights the overlaps and 
gaps. 
The ICC adopted a similar text but the distinction between conflicts of an 
international and non,international character is reflected in the distinction be, 
tween "grave breaches" and other violations of common Article 3 in this in, 
stance. Protocols I and II are neither specifically nor entirely applied, but norms 
are taken selectively therefrom and are listed under what can be termed "war 
crimes" under customary law. Subparagraph 2 (a) of Article 8 refers specifically 
to the "Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 ... " and 
lists eight such under this heading: 
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(i) Wilful killing; 
(ii) Torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments; 
(iii) Wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health; 
(iv) Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by 
military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly; 
(v) Compelling a prisoner of war or other protected person to serve in the forces 
of a h.ostile Power; 
(vi) Wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person of the rights 
of fair and regular trial; 
(vii) Unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement; 
(viii)Taking ofhostages.129 
Subparagraph 2 (b) of Article 8 refers to "Other serious violations of the laws 
and customs applicable in international armed conflict .... "130 It incorporates 
the customary law of armed conflict and some of the provisions of Protocol I. 
In subparagraphs 2 (c) and 2 (d) of Article 8, the ICC Statute then focuses on 
the distinction between conflicts of an international character and those of a 
non, international character. In so doing, it invokes the domain of common 
Article 3 of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions. Subparagraph 2(c), focusing 
on "the case of armed conflict not of an international character," refers to the 
serious violations of Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of Au, 
gust 12, 1949,"131 thus adding the limitation of "serious" to the "violations" of 
common Article 3 for the exclusive purposes of the ICC's statute. Subpara, 
graph 2(c), like subparagraph 2(a), embodies the contents of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, the former relative to "grave breaches" and the latter relative to 
the prohibitions contained in common Article 3. The latter prohibits the fol, 
lowing acts: 
(i) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, 
cruel treatment and torture; (ii) committing outrages upon personal dignity, in 
particular humiliating and degrading treatment; (iii) taking of hostages; (iv) the 
passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous 
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all judicial 
guarantees which are generally recognized as indispensable.132 
Subparagraph 2(d) of Article 8 emphasizes, like Protocol II, that subpara, 
graph 2(c) "does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, 
such as riots, isolated and specific acts of violence or other acts of a similar na, 
ture."133 The specificity contained herein by far exceeds what Protocol II con, 
tains and it is therefore specific to this statute. 
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Subparagraph 2 (e) of Article 8 is the counterpart of subparagraph 2 (b) and 
it applies customary law to armed conflicts not of an international character. 
What follows is an extensive list that includes most of the provisions of Proto, 
col II and overlaps in part with common Article 3. It also adds several specifics 
that Protocol II does not contain, but which have come to be recognized as part 
of customary law. Further, it is progressive when it comes to sexual violence in 
(vi) and to the protection of children in (vii). It reads as follows: 
(e) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed 
conflicts not of an international character, within the established framework of 
international law, namely, any of the following acts: 
{O intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as 
such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities; 
(ii) intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, 
medical units and transport, and personnel using the distinctive emblems of the 
Geneva conventions in conformity with international law; 
(iii) intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, 
material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping 
mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are 
entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the law of 
armed conflict; 
(iv) intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to 
religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, 
hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are 
not military objectives; 
(v) pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault; 
(vi) committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitu.tion, forced 
pregnancy, as defined in Article 7, paragraph 2, enforced sterilization, and any 
other form of sexual violence also constituting a serious violation of Article 3 
common to the four Geneva Conventions; 
(Vii) conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into 
armed forces or groups using them to participate actively in hostilities; 
{viii)ordering the displacement of the civilian population for reasons 
related to the conflict, unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative 
military reasons so demand; 
(ix) killing or wounding treacherously a combatant adversary; 
(x) declaring that no quarter will be given; 
(xi) subjecting persons who are in the power of another party to the 
conflict to physical mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments of any kind 
which are neither justified by the medical, dental or hospital treatment of the 
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person concerned nor carried out in his interest, and which cause death to or 
seriously endanger the health of such person or persons; 
(xii) destroying or seizing the property of an adversary unless such 
destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of the 
conflict; 
(f) Paragraph 2(e) applies to armed conflicts not of an international character 
and thus does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such 
as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature. It 
applies to armed conflicts that take place in a territory of a State when there is 
protracted armed conflict bet\veen governmental authorities and organized 
armed groups or between such groups. 
The structure of the foregoing formulation of "war crimes" is thus divided 
into four parts, reflecting the different sources of applicable law, conventional 
and customary, and the two relevant contexts, of international and 
non,international conflicts. Regrettably, these distinctions were maintained 
even though the overlaps are glaringly evident. Suffice it to compare subpara, 
graphs 2(b) and 2(e) which incorporate what the drafters believed to be cus, 
tomary law, even though it also clearly reflects existing conventional law, to 
wit, Protocol II. 134 The ICC missed the opportunity to eliminate these distinc, 
tions and to focus on the protected persons and protected targets irrespective 
of the conflicts' context. But, then, the ICC was an exercise in political feasibil, 
ity, not progressive codification. From this perspective, it must be said that the 
definition of "war crimes" is as good as can be achieved at the present time, tak, 
ing into account the diversity of concerns and interests.135 
Overlapping Prohibitions: Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity 
and War Crimes 
The crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes are con, 
tained in the Statute of the ICTY, ICTR and ICC. As discussed above, the def, 
inition and elements of these crimes differ slightly in the three statutes. 
It is important to understand that in the common law's approach, an ac, 
cused's conduct can be the basis of multiple criminal charges, all of which may" 
be presented to the court and, of course, to the jury, simultaneously, even 
though some of the charges may have different legal elements. The reason is 
that the trier of fact, expected to be the jury, is free to determine whether the 
facts, as presented and proven, satisfy the elements of any or all of the crimes 
charged on the basis of the judges instructions on the law. This approach 
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eliminates the need for the Prosecutor to make an outcome~determinative de~ 
cision at the charging stage of the criminal proceedings as to what crime or 
crimes to charge, thus leaving the Prosecutor with some leeway that may at 
times permit what is commonly referred to as the "shotgun approach."136 The 
Romanist/Civilist/Germanic~influenced systems are positivistic systems, 
whereby a Prosecutor must charge the crime that the law requires based on the 
facts of the case. The Prosecutor does not have the leeway of presenting alter~ 
native charges that differ as to their elements unless they are what is considered 
to be "lesser included crimes." Even so, the Prosecutor is bound by law to 
charge and press for the crime which the law presupposes applies best to the 
facts. 
The common law's pragmatic approach which gives the Prosecutor some 
leeway in presenting multiple charges for the same conduct, even though they 
may differ as to their elements, in effect transfers the problem of specificity of 
charges and outcomes to the stage of sentencing. Thus, the issue is no longer a 
technical legal issue of deciding specifically on the legally appropriate crime to 
charge, as opposed to multiple charges that may apply to the conduct in ques, 
tion, but whether the penalty shall be a single penalty, multiple penalties run, 
ning concurrently, or multiple penalties running consecutively. 137 
The Romanist/Civilist/Germanic systems are more positivistic than the 
common law that relies on customary law more than on codified law. Conse, 
quently, they are more rigid in their approaches, and they require, in the event 
that a given conduct can give rise to different criminal charges, that the Prose' 
cutor make such an election at the stage of the formal charges. Therefore, a 
person must be charged with a specific crime and not with alternative crimes or 
different crimes requiring different elements depending on how, in the case of 
the common law, a jury may determine which facts satisfY what crime. Neverthe, 
less, the Romanist/Civilist/Germanic,influenced legal systems recognize two 
eventualities of overlap. The first is the concours ideal d'infraction, which is 
when the legislation promulgates multiple crimes that have the same legal ele, 
ments. This is essentially the case with respect to certain aspects of the crimes of 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, as defined in the ICC's Ar, 
ticles 6, 7, and 8, and as developed in the "elements of crimes" adopted by the 
Preparatory Commission at its Fifth Session of June 30, 2000.138 The second 
eventuality arises whenever a given criminal conduct is sufficient to satisfY the 
elements of more than one crime. That too is the case with respect to the ICC's 
three crimes. The distinction between the two approaches is that the first deals 
with an overlap of the law and the second deals with a factual situation that 
may satisfy the required legal elements of more than one provision of the law. 
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To the common law jurist this Romanist/Civilist/Germanic conception of 
overlap may appear highly doctrinal. Instead, it is simply the result of a positiv~ 
ist legal approach which relies on codification and on the strict interpretation 
of the law by the judge without the existence of a jury. 139 These legal systems 
require that in the case where the same facts can be the basis of a conviction for 
more than one crime, or, in the case of the concours ideal d'infraction, that the 
conviction be only for that specific crimes which the court ultimately finds 
have been committed and where that is factually impossible, then the Court is 
to decide whether the more serious or less serious of the crimes is to apply, de~ 
pending upon the social interest protected. This approach essentially means 
that there will be only one sentence for the crime, which can of course be sub~ 
ject to mitigation or aggravation. 
In the three crimes in question, if all else is equal, the distinguishing factor is 
the nature of the protected interests, or what is called in the French legal sys~ 
tern and others in the Romanist/Civilist tradition, le bien social protege. 140 Thus, 
in genocide the protected social interest is the racial, ethnic, religious, or na~ 
tional group, irrespective of the degree to which the plan was carried out or ac~ 
complished to "eliminate that group in whole or in part." Whereas the 
protected social interest in crimes against humanity is the combination of a 
"widespread or systematic" harm committed against "any civilian population" 
in pursuit of a State "policy" or the policy of a non~State~actor. The policy ele~ 
ment in crimes against humanity is the international jurisdictional element 
that distinguishes between large scale crimes which, even though committed 
by State agents, remain part of domestic criminal jurisdiction and the category 
of an international crime called crimes against humanity. Furthermore, the 
_ distinguishing legal element between genocide and crimes against humanity is 
the requirement of a specific intent in genocide which is the "intent to elimi~ 
nate in all or in part," while crimes against humanity do not necessarily require 
specific intent as to the ultimate goal pursued, carried out or executed in pursu~ 
ance of the policy manifested by the "widespread or systematic" commission of 
certain described acts against any "civilian population." Thus, general intent is 
sufficient for crimes against humanity. 
War crimes do not require a policy, either by a State or non~State~actor; they 
also do not necessarily require specific intent. Most war crimes require knowl~ 
edge as the requisite mental element, while, in some cases, recklessness might 
suffice. War crimes is a category of international crimes that prohibit harm 
from being perpetrated on certain protected persons and targets against whom 
harmful conduct will expose the perpetrator to individual criminal responsibil~ 
ity. Furthermore, what distinguishes war crimes from the other two crimes of 
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genocide and crimes against humanity are three legal elements: 141 (a) the pro' 
hibited conduct occurred in the context of an armed conflict whether interna, 
tional or non,international; (b) by a combatant; and (c) against another 
combatant, a member of the civilian population, a protected person, or against 
a protected target. Both customary and convention law of armed conflict de, 
fine the legal context, the persons to whom the prohibitions apply and the per, 
sons and circumstances under which the protections apply. That body of law 
also provides for factual and legal defenses. 
The overlap in legal norms also extends beyond these three crimes. It in, 
cludes, for example, the commission of torture and the placing of persons under 
slavery and slave, related conditions. Torture142 and slavery and slave,related 
practices143 are the subject of specialized international criminal law conven, 
tions, but their underlying conduct is also included in the three crimes which 
are within the jurisdiction. Torture may indeed be a classic example where 
commission of torture can be the basis of a criminal charge for: (1) the viola, 
tion of the Torture Convention; 144 (2) a war crime, if conducted by a combat, 
ant in time of conflict against, for example, a prisoner of war; (3) a crime 
against humanity, if torture is used in a widespread and systematic way by State 
agents; and (4) genocide, if torture is used as an international means of destroy, 
ing a given group in whole or in part. 
Regrettably, the ICC Statute did not take into consideration the problems 
of overlap between the three crimes contained in Articles 6, 7, and 8 and ... for 
the Elements ofCrimes.l45 For the ICC however, the problem extends beyond 
what the Prosecutor should charge and what judges should find as the appro' 
priate crime committed when the provisions of the law are overlapping or when 
the facts appear to be sufficient to satisfy the elements of more than one of 
these crimes. The ICC Statute also failed to take the problems discussed above 
into account with respect to the penalties.146 The Preparatory Commission 
also failed to take the opportunity in working on rules of procedure and evi, 
dence to deal with the questions of concurrent and consecutive sentencing. 
Furthermore, the ICC Statute contains a provision in Article 20 on ne bis in 
idem.I47 Thus the problem of overlap will also reach the Court not only by 
means of what is an appropriate charge and what the judges should appropri, 
ately convict on, and what penalty to mete out, but also on how the Court, and 
for that matter how the Prosecutor, will determine whether a given criminal 
conviction by a national court will be deemed a bar to another prosecution be, 
fore the ICC and whether a given conviction by the ICC will bar prosecution 
before the ICC or before national courts for another crime which may be based 
on substantially the same facts. 
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It is therefore expected that the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC will have to struggle 
with these problems and hopefully arrive at a conclusion which will provide 
certainty of the law and predictability of outcomes. 
TheICTY 
The ICTY confronted that issue in the case of Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, et 
al. 148 In that judgment, the trial chamber posited the problem as follows: 
(ii) Relationship between the various Offences Charged in the Indictment 
696. Having set out the general principles of criminal law governing 
multiple offences in international law, the Trial Chamber will now 
apply these principles to the relations between the various substantive 
provisions of the Statute relied upon by the parties in the instant case. 
697. Unlike provisions of national criminal codes or, in common-law 
countries, rules of criminal law crystallised in the relevant case-law or 
found in statutory enactments, each Article of the Statute does not 
confine itself to indicating a single category of well-defined acts such as 
murder, voluntary or involuntary manslaughter, theft, etc. Instead the 
Articles embrace broad clusters of offences sharing certain general legal 
ingredients. It follows that, for instance, a crime against humanity may 
consist of such diverse acts as the systematic extermination of civilians 
with poison gas or the widespread persecution of a group on racial 
grounds. Similarly, a war crime may for instance consist in the summary 
execution of a prisoner of war or the carpet bombing of a town. 
698. In addition, under the Statute of the International Tribunal, 
some provisions have such a broad scope that they may overlap. True, 
some acts may only be characterised as war crimes (Article 3): e.g., the 
use of prohibited weapons against enemy combatants, attacking 
undefended towns, etc. Other acts or transactions may only be defined 
as crimes against humanity (Article 5): e.g., persecution of civilians, 
whatever their nationality, on racial, religious or political grounds. 
However, other acts, depending upon certain circumstances, may 
either be characterised as war crimes or both as war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. For instance, murder, torture or rape of enemy 
civilians normally constitute war crimes; however, if these acts are part 
of a widespread or systematic practice, they may also be defined as 
crimes against humanity. Plainly, Articles 3 and 5 have a different 
scope, which, however, may sometimes coincide or overlap. 
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699. In order to apply the principles on cumulation of offences set out 
above specific offences rather than diverse sets of crimes must be 
considered. The Trial Chamber wUl therefore analyse the relationship 
between the single offences with which the accused are charged, such 
as murder as a war crime, murder as a crime against humanity, etc. 
1. Relationship Between "Murder" under Article 3 (War 
Crimes) and "Murder" under Article 5(a) (Crimes Against 
Humanity) 
700. Following the principles set out above, the relevant question here 
is whether murder as a war crime requires proof of facts which murder as 
a crime against humanity does not require, and vice versa (the 
Blockburger test). Another relevant question is whether the prohibition 
of murder as a war crime protects different values from those 
safeguarded by the prohibition of murder as a crime against humanity. 
701. With regard to the former question, while murder as a crime 
against humanity requires proof of elements that murder as a war crime 
does not require (the offence must be part of a systematic or widespread 
attack on the civilian population), this is not reciprocated. As a result, 
the Blockburger< test is not fulfilled, or in other words the two offences 
are not in a relationship of reciprocal speciality. The prohibition of 
murder as a crime against humanity is lex specialis in relation to the 
prohibition of murder as a war crime [footnote 958].149 
702. In addressing the latter question, it can generally be said that the 
substantive provisions of the Statute pursue the same general objective 
(deterring serious breaches of humanitarian law and, if these breaches 
are committed, punishing those responsible for them). In addition, 
they protect the same general values in that they are designed to ensure 
respect for human dignity. Admittedly, within this common general 
framework, Articles 3 and 5 may pursue some specific aims and protect 
certain specific values. Thus, for instance, the prohibition of war crimes 
aims at ensuring a minimum of humanitarian concern between 
belligerents as well as maintaining a distinction between combatants' 
behaviour toward enemy combatants and persons not participating in 
hostilities. The prohibition of crimes against humanity, on the other 
hand, is more focused on discouraging attacks on the civilian 
population and the persecution of identifiable groups of civilians. 
703. However, as under Article 5 of the Statute crimes against 
humanity fall within the Tribunal's jurisdiction only when committed 
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in armed conflict, the difference between the values protected by 
Article 3 and Article 5 would seem to be inconsequential. 
704. As explained above, the validity of the criterion based on the 
difference in values protected is disputable if it is not also supported by 
reciprocal speciality between the two offences. It follows that, given 
also the marginal difference in values protected, the Trial Chamber 
may convict the Accused in violating the prohibition of murder as a 
crime against humanity only if it finds that the requirements of murder 
under both Article 3 and under Article 5 are proved. 
2. Relationship Between "Persecution" under Article 5 (h) 
(Crimes Against Humanity) and "Murder" under Article 5 (a) 
(Crimes Against Humanity) 
705. On the grounds set out above, the Trial Chamber agrees with the 
Prosecutor that "persecution" may comprise not only murder carried 
out with a discriminatory intent but also crimes other than murder. 
Count 1 of the indictment, which charges persecution, refers not only 
to killing, but also to "the comprehensive destruction of Bosnian 
Muslim homes and property" (para. 21{b)) and "the organised 
detention and expulsion of the Bosnian Muslims from Ahmici-£)antici 
and its environs" (para. 21{c)); in short, what in non-legal terms is 
commonly referred to as "ethnic cleanSing". There are clearly 
additional elements here beyond murder. 
706. As for the relations between murder as a crime against humanity 
and persecution as a crime against humanity, it should be noted that 
persecution requires a discriminatory element which murder, albeit as a 
crime against humanity, does not. The Trial Chamber is of the view 
therefore that there is reciprocal speciality between these crimes; 
indeed, both may have unique elements. An accused may be guilty of 
persecution for destroying the homes of persons belonging to another 
ethnic group and expelling the occupants, without however being 
found guilty of any acts of killing. The destruction of homes and the 
expulsion of persons, if carried out with a discriminatory intent, may in 
and of themselves be sufficient to constitute persecution. Equally, an 
accused may commit a non-discriminatory murder as part of a 
widespread attack on a civilian population which, because it is 
non-discriminatory, fails to satisfy the definition of persecution. These, 
then, are two separate offences, which may be equally charged. 
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707. If an accused is found guilty of persecution, inter alia because of 
the commission of murders, it seems that he should be found guilty of 
persecution only, and not of murder and persecution, because in that 
case the Blockburger test is not met: murder is in that case already 
encompassed within persecution as a form of aggravated murder, and it 
does not possess any elements which the persecutory murders do not. 
Hence, in that case, murder may be seen as either falling under lex 
generalis or as a lesser included offence, and a conviction should not 
ensue when there is already a conviction under lex specialis or for the 
more serious office, i.e. persecutory murder. 
708. Things however are different when a person is charged both with 
murder as a crime against humanity and with persecution (including 
murder) as a crime against humanity. In this case the same acts of 
murder may be material to both crimes. This is so if it is proved that (i) 
murder as a form of persecution meets both the requirement of 
discriminatory intent and that of the widespread or systematic practice 
of persecution, and (ii) murder as a crime against humanity fulfils the 
requirement for the wilful taking of life of innocent civilians and that of 
a widespread or systematic practice of murder of civilians. If these 
requirements are met, we are clearly faced with a case of reciprocal 
speciality or in other words the requirements of the Blockburger test are 
fulfilled. Consequently, murder will constitu·te an offence under both 
provisions of the Statute {Article 5 (h) and (a)). 
709. Let us now consider whether the prohibition of persecution as a 
crime against humanity protects different values from those 
safeguarded by the prohibition of murder as a crime against humanity. 
It is clear that the criminalisation of murder and persecution may serve 
different values. The prohibition of murder aims at protecting innocent 
civilians from being obliterated on a large scale. More generally, it 
intends to safeguard human life in terms of armed conflicts. On the 
other hand, the ban on persecution intends to safeguard civilians from 
severe forms of discrimination. This ban is designed to reaffirm and 
impose respect for the principle of equality between groups and human 
beings. 
710. This test then bears out and corroborates the result achieved by 
using the other test. Under the conditions described above, the test 
based on protection of values leads to the conclusion that the same act or 
transaction (murder) may infringe two different provisions of Article 5 
of the Statute. 
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3. Relationship Between "Inhumane Acts" under Article 5 (i) 
(Crimes Against Humanity) and "Cruel Treatment" under 
Article 3 (War Crimes) 
711. These two crimes are clearly presented as alternatives in the 
Indictment and should be considered as such. Except for the element 
of widespread or systematic practice required for crimes against 
humanity, each of them does not require proof of elements not required 
by the other. In other words, it is clear that every time an inhumane act 
under Article 5 (i) is committed, ipso facto cruel treatment under Article 
3 is inflicted. The reverse is however not true: cruel treatment under 
Article 3 may not be covered by Article 5 (i) if the element of 
widespread or systematic practice is missing. Thus if the evidence 
proves the commission of the facts in questiol1, a conviction should only 
be recorded for one of these two offences: inhumane acts, if the 
background conditions for crimes against humanity are satisfied, and if 
they are not, cruel treatment as a war crime. Given this, it is not strictly 
necessary to consider the "different values test", since the Blockburger 
test is ultimately dispositive of the issue. 
4. Relationship Between the Charges for Inhumane Acts (or 
Cruel Treatment) and the Charges for Murder 
712. A brief word here should be said about the relationship between 
charges for inhumane acts/cruel treatment and murder. In Counts 2,9, 
for example, the accused are charged with the murder of the Ahmici 
family, and in Counts 10,11 for inhumane acts/cruel treatment of 
Witness KL by murdering his family before his eyes. These are clearly 
separate offences. Not only are the elements different, but the victims 
are even different. Witness KL's family are the victims of the murder 
counts, while KL himself is the victim of the inhumane acts/cruel 
treatment counts. 
(iii) The Sentence to be Imposed in the Event of More Than One 
Conviction for A Single Action 
713. The question remains a~ to how a double conviction for a single 
action shall be reflected in sentencing. Both parties seem to agree that 
a defendant should not suffer two distinct penalties, to be served 
consecutively, for the same transaction. However, the Trial Chamber 
is under a duty to apply the provisions of the Statute and customary 
international law. Article 24(1) of the Statute provides that: 
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The penalty imposed by the Trial Chamber shall be limited to 
imprisonment. In determining the term of imprisonment, the Trial 
Chamber shall have recourse to the general practice regarding 
prison sentences in the courts of the former Yugoslavia. 
714. Pursuant to Article 48 of the former SFRY -Criminal Code, which 
is still applied in the successor States of the SFRY, if the accused has 
committed several criminal offences by one action, the court shall first 
assess the punishment for each criminal offence and then proceed with 
the determination of the principal punishment. In the case of 
imprisonment, the court shall impose one punishment consisting of an 
aggravation of the most severe punishment assessed, but the aggravated 
punishment may not be as high as the total of all incurred punishments 
[footnote 959].150 
715. The 1997 Criminal Code of the Republic· of Croatia contains 
similar rules on sentencing in the case of multiple offences committed 
by one action [footnote 960].151 Outside the former Yugoslavia, the 
Italian Criminal Code includes a similar rule [footnote 961].152 
716. As was held by the Trial Chamber in the Tadic case, "[t]he 
practice of courts in the former Yugoslavia does not delimit the sources 
upon which the Trial Chamber may rely in reaching its determination 
of the appropriate sentence for a convicted person" [footnote 962].153 
In numerous legal systems, the penalty imposed in case of multiple 
convictions for offences committed by one action is limited to the 
punishment provided for the most serious offence. An instance of this 
approach is represented by Article 52(2) of the German Penal Code 
[footnote 963].154 
718. The following proposition commends itself as sound. If under the 
principles set out above aTrial Chamber finds that by a single act or 
omission the accused has perpetrated two offences under two distinct 
provisions of the Statute, and that the offences contain elements 
uniquely required by each provision, the Trial Chamber shall find the 
accused guilty on two separate counts. In that case the sentences 
consequent upon the convictions for the same act shall be served 
concurrently, but the Trial Chamber may [increase] the sentence for 
the more serious offence if it considers that the less serious offence 
committed by the same conduct significantly adds to the heinous 
nature of the prevailing offence, for instance because the less serious 
offence is· characterised by distinct, highly reprehensible elements of its 
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own (e.g. the use of poisonous weapons in conjunction with the more 
serious crime of genocide). 
719. On the other hand, if a Trial Chamber finds under the principles 
set out above that by a single act or omission the accused has not 
perpetrated two offences under two distinct provisions of the Statute 
but only one offence, then the Trial Chamber will have to decide on the 
appropriate conviction for that offence only. For example, if the more 
specialised offence, e.g. genocide in the form of murder, is made out on 
the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, then a conviction should be 
recorded for that offence and not for the offence of murder as a war 
crime. In that case only one conviction will be recorded and only one 
sentence will be imposed. 
The ICTR 
The ICTR also faced that question in Prosecutor v. Akeyusu. 155 In that 
case, the trial chamber took a different approach from that of the ICTY trial 
chamber in the Kupreskic case referred to above. Thus the difference may 
well be due to the fact that the ICTR Trial Chamber was more influenced by 
French Civilist legal concepts while the ICTY took another approach, which 
happened to be akin to a common law pragmatic approach. In the Kupreskic 
case, the ICTY relied on the Yugoslavian criminal law, while in the Akeyusu 
case, the ICTR relied on the criminal law of Rwanda, which originally derived 
from Belgian law, influenced by French law. Yugoslavian criminal law is also 
influenced by French law, though as well by certain so~called socialist con~ 
ceptions of criminal law which had developed during the prior regime. The 
Akeyusu case posed the problem in terms of what French criminal law doc~ 
trine refers to as concours ideal d'infractions. 156 The issue was addressed as 
follows: 
196. 6. THE LAW: 6.1 Cumulative Charges 
199. The question which arises at this stage is whether, if the Chamber 
is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that a given factual allegation 
set out in the Indictment has been established, it may find the accused 
guilty of all of the crimes charged in relation to those facts or only one. 
The reason for posing this question is that it might be argued that the 
accumulation of criminal charges offends against the principle of 
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double jeopardy or a substantive non bis in idem principle in criminal 
law. Thus an accused who is found guilty of both genocide and crimes 
against humanity in relation to the same set of facts may argue that he 
has been twice judged for the same offence, which is generally 
considered impermissible in criminal law. 
[paragraph omitted] 
201. The Chamber notes that this question has been posed, and 
answered, by the Trial Chamber of the ICTY in the first case before that 
Tribunal, The Prosecutor v. Dusko T adic. Trial Chamber II, confronted 
with this issue, stated: 
202. "In any event, since this is a matter that will only be relevant 
insofar as it might affect penalty cannot be made to depend upon 
whether offences arising from the same conduct are alleged 
cumulatively or in the alternative. What is to be punished by penalty is 
proven criminal conduct and that will not depend upon technicalities 
of pleading." (Prosecutor v. T adic, Decision on Defence Motion on Form 
of the Indictment at p. 10 (No. IT-94-1-T, T.Ch.lI, 14 Nov, 1995). 
203. In that case, when the matter reached the sentencing stage, the 
Trial Chamber dealt with the matter of cumulative criminal charges by 
imposing concurrent sentences for each cumulative charge. Thus, for 
example, in relation to one particular beating, the accused received 7 
years' imprisonment for the beating as a crime against humanity, and a 
6 year concurrent sentence for the same beating as a violation of the 
laws or customs of war. 
[paragraph omitted] 
205. The Chamber takes due note of the practice of the ICTY. This 
practice was also followed in the Barbie case, where the French Cour de 
Cassation held that a single event could be qualified both as a crime 
against humanity and as a war crime. 
[paragraph omitted] 
207. It is clear that the practice of concurrent sentencing ensures that 
the accused is not twice punished for the same acts. Notwithstanding 
this absence of prejudice to the accused, it is still necessaty to justify the 
prosecutorial practice of accumulating criminal charges. 
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[paragraph omitted] 
209. The Chamber notes that in Civil Law systems, including that of 
Rwanda, there exists a principle known as concours ideal d'infractioTlS 
which permits multiple convictions for the same act under ceratin 
circumstances. Rwandan law allows multiple convictions in the 
following circumstances: 
210. Code penal du Rwanda: Chapitre VI-Du concour5 
d'infractions: 
Article 92., II y a concours d'infractions lorsque plusieurs infractions 
ont ete commises par Ie meme auteur sans qu'une condamnation soit 
intervenue entre ces infractions. 
Article 93., II y concours ideal: 
10 lorsque Ie fait unique au point de vue materiel est susceptible de 
plusieurs qualifications; 
20 lorsque l'action comprend des faits qui, constituant des 
infractions distinctes, sont unis entre eux comme procedant d'une 
intention delictueuse unique ou comme etant les uns des 
circonstances aggravantes des autres. 
Seront seules prononcees dans Ie premier cas les peines determinees 
par la qualification la plus severe, dans Ie second cas les peines 
prevues pour la repression de l'infraction la plus grave, mais dont Ie 
maximum pourra etre alors eleve de moitie. 
211. On the basis of national and international law and jurisprudence, 
the Chamber concludes that it is acceptable to convict the accused of 
two offences in relation to the same set of facts in the following 
circumstances: (1) where the offences have different elements; or 
(2) where the provisions creating the offences protect different 
interests; or (3) where it is necessary to record a conviction for both 
offences in order fully to describe what the accused did. However, 
the Chamber finds that it is not justifiable to convict an accused of 
two offences in relation to the same set of facts where (a) one offence 
is a lesser included offence of the other, for example, murder and 
grievous bodily harm, robbery and theft, or rape and indecent assault; 
or (b) where one offence charges accomplice liability and the other 
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offence charges liability as a principal, e.g. genocide and complicity in 
genocide. 
[paragraph omitted] 
213. Having regard to its Statute, the Chamber believes that the 
offences under the Statute-genocide, crimes against humanity, and 
violations of article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of 
Additional Protocol II-have different elements and, moreover, are 
intended to protect different interests. The crime of genocide exists to 
protect certain groups from extermination or attempted extermination. 
The concept of crimes against humanity exists to protect civilian 
populations from persecution. The idea of violations of article 3 
common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II is to 
protect non-combatants from war crimes in civil war. These crimes in 
relation to the sa~e set purposes and are, therefore, never co-extensive. 
Thus it is legitimate to charge these crimes in relation to the same set of 
facts. It may, additionally, depending on the case, be necessary to 
record a conviction for more than one of these offences in order to 
reflect what crimes an accused committed. If, for example, a general 
ordered that all prisoners of war belonging to a particular ethnic group 
should be killed, with the intent thereby to eliminate the group, this 
would be both genocide and a violation of common article 3, although 
not necessarily a crime agairist humanity. Convictions for genocide and 
violations of common article 3 would accurately reflect the accused 
general's course of conduct. 
[paragraph omitted] 
215. Conversely, the Chamber does not consider that any of the 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of article 3 common 
to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II are lesser 
included forms of each other. The ICTR Statute does not establish a 
hierarchy of norms, but rather all three offenses are presented on an 
equal footing. While genocide may be considered the gravest crime, 
there is no justification in the Statute for finding that crimes against 
humanity or violations of common article 3 and Additional Protocol II 
are in all circumstances alternative charges to genocide and thus lesser 
include offences. As stated, and it is a related point, these offences have 
different constituent elements. Again, this consideration renders 
multiple convictions for these offences in relation to the same set of 
facts permissible. 
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The ICC 
The Statute did not take into account the various issues raised by the over~ 
lap between these three crimes. This is evident in the absence of any reference 
to that question in connection to the definition of crimes as well as in connec~ 
tion with the Elements developed by the Preparatory Commission.157 The 
problem of overlap has been particularly aggravated by the elements of crime 
which seem, in so many cases, to be identical particularly with respect to the 
material conduct of the perpetrator (such as that of killing or torturing). It 
should be noted that the Statute does not contain a provision on the material 
element of the crime which is a significant omission. This was due to the fact 
that the delegates did not seem to be able to agree on the distinctions between 
commission and omission.158 A distinguishing feature as to these three crimes, 
particularly when the material conduct is identical, is the mental element. Ar~ 
ticle 30 on the mental element in the Statute lacks sufficient clarity to allow for 
the subtle distinctions that would be required. It appears that the Elements 
sought to partially remedy the situation by adding throughout the different de~ 
scriptive elements such words as "intended," "aware of," and "knew or should 
have known of the conduct."159 In the opinion of this writer, the drafting of the 
Elements produces further confusion with respect to the problem of overlap 
(not to speak of other problems they are likely to create when the Court will 
seek to apply them). 
Articles 77 to 79 deal with penalties, but these articles do not address the is~ 
sues that arise out of a conviction for multiple crimes arising out of the same 
conduct.160 Thus the problem of overlap which could have been resolved in 
the sentencing was not addressed in the Statute. Thus it is theoretically possi~ 
ble not only to have the same conduct give rise to a conviction for more than 
one crime, but for this conviction to give rise to multiple penalties. One can as~ 
sume that the judges will have the good sense of at least having the sentences 
run concurrently as opposed to consecutively, but it would have surely been 
better if the Statute would have provided for it. 
Lastly, these overlaps raise a series of questions with respect to ne bis in 
idem.16I If a given conduct can be the basis of multiple convictions because of 
overlap of three crimes, what legal criteria should be relied upon by the ICC to 
determine whether a .conviction in a national legal system falls within. the 
meaning of ne bis in idem. The converse is also true with respect to States parties 
who are required to recognize ICC judgements and not to prosecute the same 
person for the crime for which that person was previously prosecuted before 
the ICC. 
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One would have hoped that the Statute and the Elements would have re~ 
solved these issues. Instead, they have simply avoided them entirely. 
N ot only are there overlaps in some applications of the sources of law relevant to war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, there 
also are gaps and ambiguities in their content and scope. So far, however, there 
is no political will to close the gaps and eliminate the ambiguities. Thus, it is 
necessary to examine these sources oflaw separately in order to establish which 
source applies to which context and then to determine whether the legal ele~ 
ments contained in the applicable sources apply to the facts. 162 
Some 188 States have so far embodied "war crimes" in their military codes. 
This is a requirement of the Geneva Conventions and therefore every State 
party must domesticate their provisions and criminalize "grave breaches" viola~ 
tions. However, prosecutions for "war crimes" or "grave breaches" or an equiv~ 
alent term {such as violations of the military code} have, with the exception of 
the prosecutions arising out of World War II,163 been few and far between. 
Since 1949, Germany has prosecuted an estimated 60,000 cases mostly in the 
categories of genocide and war crimes, but the United States, in relation to the 
Vietnam War, prosecuted only two cases for war crimes-the Calley164 and 
Medina165 cases. It is noteworthy, too, that the only case brought against one of 
the World War II Allies for war crimes, by Japanese citizens for the use by the 
United States of atomic weapons against Japan, which killed and injured an es~ 
timated 225,000 innocent civilians, 166 was dismissed by the Supreme Court of 
Japan on technical jurisdictional grounds.167 
With respect to "crimes against humanity," Canada, France, and Israel have 
been the only countries to have carried out prosecutions. In Israel, the 
Eichmann168 and Demjanjuk169 cases were carried out, both for crimes not com~ 
mitted in the territory of the prosecuting State. Demjanjuk was acquitted be~ 
cause he turned out to be the wrong person. In France, prosecutions have 
occurred for Barbie,170 Touvier,l7l and Papon. l72 In 1989, Canada prosecuted 
the first case under a 1987 statute that permits retrospective application of in~ 
ternationallaw.l73 This writer served as Canada's chieflegal expert in testify~ 
ing on what constituted "crimes against humanity" before 1945. Regina 
resulted in the acquittal of Hungarian Gendarmerie Captain Finta on the facts 
but the judgment recognized the existence of "crimes against humanity" under 
international law before 1945. Prosecutions before the ICTY and ICTR have 
included "war crimes," "crimes against humanity," and "genOcide," but when 
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the opportunity arose to prosecute Pol Pot for such crimes in Cambodia, it was 
not seized.l74 
Many of the specific acts deemed criminal are contained within the defini, 
tions of "war crimes," "crimes against humanity," and "genocide." That is 
where the overlap exists. Thus, legal questions arise as to when the same acts 
constitute one or the other of these three crimes. At this point, a jurist must ex, 
amine the other legal elements required in the sources of law applicable to 
these three categories of crime. The "grave breaches" of the 1949 Geneva con' 
ventions175 and Protocol P 76 are the clearest enunciation of what the elements 
of "war crimes" are, but that is because they apply to the context of conflicts of 
an international character. This is not quite the case with respect to common 
Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva conventions177 and Protocol II, 178 which apply to 
conflicts of a non,international character, but with the exclusion in Protocol II 
of conflicts between internal dissident groups. Still, the gap between normative 
proscriptions applicable to the two contexts of conflicts exists, as does the over, 
lap between these violations. The overlaps essentially are aimed at individual 
deviant conduct, the same type of criminal conduct that falls also within the 
scope of crimes against humanity and genocide, since the latter two crimes ap, 
ply to all contexts of armed conflicts as well as to other non, armed conflicts 
contexts and to tyrannical regime victimization. Clearly, such a situation need 
not exist since it would be easy to articulate the elements of each of these three 
categories of crimes clearly, in a way that prevents these unnecessary overlaps 
and gaps. So far, however, the political will to do so is nonexistent. 
Because there is a connection between the rigors of evidentiary require, 
ments to prove "war crimes," "crimes against humanity," and "genocide," and 
access to that evidence, the major governments who have the capacity to ob, 
tain such evidence remain in control of its use, and thereby in control of any 
eventual prosecution. This leaves such governments with the option to barter 
the pursuit of justice in exchange for political settlements. 179 An examination 
of what happened in all types of post' World War II conflicts clearly indicates 
that the pursuit of justice has been almost always bartered away for the pursuit 
of political settlements. 180 Consequently, the pursuit of justice has become part 
of the toolbox of political settlement negotiations.18l This is true for all three 
major crimes, essentially because they are committed by armies, police, and 
paramilitary groups which act pursuant to orders from the State's highest au, 
thorides. The need for an integrated codification of these three categories of 
crimes is self, evident. But when that opportunity arose in connection with the 
establishment of a permanent international criminal court, it was carefully 
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avoided for lack of political will by many governments, including the major 
powers. 
The road ahead is arduous and the same hurdles that have long existed con~ 
tinue to bar the way for the effective protection of the victims of these three 
major crimes. The voices of millions of victims since World War I continue to 
cry out, unheard by the politicians of this world, and the sway of conscience 
represented by civil society is insufficient to overcome the steadfastness of real~ 
politik. To recall the words of a popular ballad of the sixties: "When will they 
ever learn." 
Impunity for international crimes, and systematic and widespread violations 
of fundamental human rights, is a betrayal of our human solidarity with the vic~ 
tims of conflicts to whom we owe a duty of justice, remembrance, and redress. 
To remember and to bring perpetrators to justice is a duty we owe also to our 
own humanity and to the prevention of future victimization. 182 To paraphrase 
George Santayana, if we cannot learn from the lessons of the past and stop the 
practice of impunity, we are condemned to repeat the same mistakes and to suf~ 
fer their consequences. The reason for our commitment to this goal can be 
found in the eloquent words ofJohn Donne: 
No man is an island, entire of itself; 
every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main ... 
Any man's death diminishes me because I am involved in mankind, and 
therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; 
it tolls for thee ... .183 
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Commentary, Geneva Convention IV, on the treatment of civilians, both of which 
advocate a broad interpretation of the term "civilian." They, and particularly Common 
Article 3, do, however, provide guidance in answering the most difficult question: 
specifically, whether acts taken against an individual who cannot be considered a 
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14. This estimate is by some accounts for all conflicts since World War I, and by others for all 
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e.g., R.J. RUMMEL, STATISTICS OF DEMOCIDE, GENOCIDE AND MASS MURDER SINCE 1900 
40 
M. Cherif Bassiouni 
(1997); Margareta Sollenberg & Peter Wallesteen, Major Armed Conflicts in 1995, in SIPRI 
YEARBOOK 1996 (1996). There were cwo studies reported in the PIOOM Newsletter and 
Progress Report in 1994 and 1995: A.J. Jongman & A.P. Schmid, Contemporary Conflicts: A 
Global Survey of High and Lower Intensity Conflicts and Serious Disputes, 7 PIOOM NEWSLETIER 
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respect to the United States Jan. 26, 1910) [hereinafter 1907 Hague Convention]' reprinted in 2 
\Veston, supra note 2, at II.B.1. 
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Bevans 1238, entered into force Aug. 8, 1945 [hereinafter London Charter], reprinted in 2 
Weston, supra note 2, at II.E.1. See also Special Prosecution Establishing an International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East and Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far 
East, Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589, at 3,4 Bevans 20 [hereinafter IMTFE], reprinted in 2 
Weston, supra note 2, at II.E.2. Article 5 (c) is similar to Article 6(c) of the London Charter, as is 
Article II (c) of Control Council Law No. 10, though it removes the war connecting requirement. 
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and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, 5 U.N. GAORSupp. (No. 12) at 11, U.N. Doc. N1316 
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2, at II.E.4. 
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31. See BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 4. 
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33. See Statute of the International Tribunal (for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Serious Violations of Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia) 
May 25, 1993, S.c. Res. 827, U.N. SCaR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 
(1993); [hereinafterICTY Statute), reprinted in 32 LL.M. 1159, and 2 Weston, supra note 2, at 
ILE.lO. 
34. Prosecutor v. DuSko Tadic, (IT-94-I-T), reprinted in 36 LL.M. 908 (1997). See also ICTY 
Statute, supra note 33. Concerning the war-connecting link, the T adic decision stated: 
Article 5 of the Statute, addressing crimes against humanity, grants the International 
Tribunal jurisdiction over the enumerated acts "when committed in armed conflict." The 
requirement of an armed conflict is similar to that of Article 6(c) of the Niirnberg Charter 
which limited the Niirnberg Tribunal's jurisdiction to crimes against humanity committed 
"before or during the war," although in the case of the Niirnberg Tribunal jurisdiction was 
further limited by requiring that crimes against humanity be committed "in execution of 
or in connection with" war crimes or crimes against peace. Despite this precedent, the 
inclusion of the requirement of an armed conflict deviates from the development of the 
doctrine after the Niimberg Charter, beginning with Control Council Law No. 10, which 
no longer links the concept of crimes against humanity with an armed conflict. As the 
Secretary-General stated: "Crimes against humanity are aimed at any civilian population 
and are prohibited regardless of whether they are committed in an armed conflict, 
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Rwanda the requirement of an armed conflict is omitted, requiring only that acts be 
committed as part of an attack against a civilian population. The Appeals Chamber has 
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may have defined the crime in Article 5 more narrowly than necessary under customary 
international law," having stated earlier that "[slince customary international law no 
longer requires any nexus between crimes against humanity and armed conflict ... Article 
5 was intended to reintroduce this nexus for the purposes of this Tribunal." Accordingly, 
its existence must be proved, as well as the link between the act or omission charged and 
the armed conflict. 
The Appeals Chamber, as discussed in greater detail in Section VI.A of this Opinion 
and Judgment, stated that "an armed conflict exists whenever there is resort to armed 
force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and 
organized armed groups or between such groups within a State." Consequently, this is the 
test which the Trial Chamber has applied and it has concluded that the evidence 
establishes the existence of an armed conflict. 
The next issue which must be addressed is the required nexus between the act or 
omission and the armed conflict. The Prosecution argues that to establish the nexus for a 
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violation of Article 5 it is sufficient to demonstrate that the crimes were committed at 
some point in the course or duration of an armed conflict, even if such crimes were not 
committed in direct relation to or as part of the conduct of hostilities, occupation, or other 
integral aspects of the armed conflict. In contrast the Defence argues that the act must be 
committed "in" armed conflict. 
The Statute does not elaborate on the required link between the act and the armed 
conflict. Nor, for that matter, does the Appeals Chamber Decision, although it contains 
several statements that are relevant in this regard. First is the finding, noted above, that 
the Statute is more restrictive than custom in that "customary international law no longer 
requires any nexus between crimes against humanity and armed conflict." Accordingly, it 
is necessary to determine the degree of nexus which is imported by the Statute by its 
inclusion of the requirement of an armed conflict. This, then, is a question of statutory 
interpretation. 
The Appeals Chamber Decision is relevant to this question of statutory interpretation. 
In addressing Article 3 the Appeals Chamber noted that where interpretative 
declarations are made by Security Council members and are not contested by other 
delegations "they can be regarded as providing an authoritative interpretation" of the 
relevant provisions of the Statute. Importantly, several permanent members of the 
Security Council commented that they interpret "when committed in armed conflict" in 
Article 5 of the Statute to mean "during a period of armed conflict." These statements 
were not challenged and can thus, in line with the Appeals Chamber Decision, be 
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The Appeals Chamber, in dismissing the Defense argument that the concept of armed 
conflict covers only the precise time and place of actual hostilities, said: "It is sufficient 
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territories controlled by the parties to the conflict." Thus it is not necessary that the acts 
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Prosecutor v. DuSko Tadic, (IT-94-1-T), reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 908, 913 (1997) (citations and 
footnotes omitted). 
35. See Resolution 955 (1994) Establishing the International Tribunal For Rwanda, Nov. 8, 
1994, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), supra 
AppendLx I [hereinafter ICTRStatute], reprinted in33 I.L.M.1598, and 2 Weston, supra note 2, 
at II.E.12. 
36. See id., art. 3. 
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BASSIOUNI, & PETER MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE 
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 199-235 (1996). The Appeals Chamber in the Tadic case noted that "it 
is by now a settled Rule of customary international law that crimes against humanity do not 
require a connection to international armed conflict. Indeed ... customary international law 
may not require a connection between crimes against humanity and any conflict at all." Decision 
in Prosecutor v. DuSko Tadic, (IT-94-1-AR72), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32, at 72 (1996). Further, 
the T adic decision stated: 
43 
The Normative Framework of International Humanitarian Law 
If customary international law is determinative of what type of conflict is required in 
order to constitute a crime against humanity, the prohibition against crimes against 
humanity is necessarily part of customary international law. As such, the commission of 
crimes against humanity violates customary international law, of which Article 5 of the 
Statute is, for the most part, reflective. As stated by the Appeals Chamber: "There is no 
question ... that the definition of crimes against humanity adopted by the Security 
Council in Article 5 comports with the principle of nullum crimen sine lege." 
Id. at 937. The Appeals Chamber in the Nikolic case noted that a crime against humanity must be 
shown to have been committed in the course of an armed conflict. Nikolic Rule 61 Hearing, 
(IT-95-2-R61). 
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does not refer to the words "widespread or systematic" contained in Article 3 of the ICTR. Yet, in 
the Tadic opinion the Trial Chamber referred to the words "Widespread or systematic" using the 
disjunctive. See generally MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE (1997). 
44. See BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY. supra note 4, at Ch. 4 "The Principles of 
Legality." 
45. See w., Ch. 5. 
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NUREMBERG TRIAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 177 (George Ginsburgs & Vladimir N. 
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ROME STATUTE, ISSUES. NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 79-126, (Roy S. Lee ed .• 1999); Margaret 
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HUM. RTS. Q. (2000). 
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84. See ICTR Statute, supra note 35, art. 2. 
85. ICC Statute, supra note 13, art. 2. 
86. See Genocide Convention, supra note 58. 
87. See von Hebel & Robinson, supra note 52. 
88. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 121949, 6 U.S.T.3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 4 Bevans 853 (entered 
into force Oct. 21, 1950), (entered into force with respect to the United States Feb. 2, 1956), 
reprinted in 2 Weston, supra note 2, at II.B.ll; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 
6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) (entered into force with 
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respect to the United States Feb. 2,1956) reprinted in 2 \Y!eston,supra note 2, atII.B.12; Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3316,75 
U.N.T.S. 135,47 AM. J. INTL L. 119 (1953) (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) (entered into 
force with respect to the United States Feb. 2, 1956), reprinted in 2 \Y!eston, supra note 2, at 
II.B.13; 53 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 
Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3516,75 U.N.T.S. 287, 50AM.J. INTLL. 119 (entered into force Oct. 
21, 1950) (entered into force with respect to the United States Feb. 2, 1956), reprinted in 2 
\Y!eston, supra note 2, at ILB.14. 
89. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts of 8 June 1977 [hereinafter 1977 
ProtocolIl, opened for signature at Berne, Dec. 12,1977, U.N. Doc. N32/144 (1977), Annex I, 
(entered into force Dec. 7, 1978), reprinted in 16 LL.M. 1391, and 2 Weston, supra note 2, at 
II.B.20; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts [hereinafter 1977 Protocol II], 
Dec. 12, 1977, U.N. Doc. N32/144 (1977) Annex II, (entered into force Dec. 17, 1978), 
reprinted in 16 LL.M. 1391, and 2 Weston, supra note 2, at II.B.2l. 
90. Customary international law consists of the practice of states confirmed by their intention 
to be legally bound by the practice. See Akehurst, supra note 29; Hiram E. Chodosh, An 
Interpretive Theory of International Law; The Distinction Between Treaty and Customary Law, 28 
VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 973 (1995); D'AMATO, supra note 29; Jordan J. Paust, Customary 
International Law; Its Nature, Sources and Status as Law oj the United States, 12 MICH. J. INTL L. 
59,61 (1990); JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
(1996). But see Curtis A. Bradley &Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal 
Common Law; A Critique oJ the Modem Position, 110 HARV. L. REv. 815 (1997). 
9l. See Bassiouni, supra note 6, and the authorities cited therein. 
92. At present there are 25 categories ofinternational crimes. They are: (1) aggression; (2) 
genocide; (3) crimes against humanity; (4) war crimes; (5) crimes against United Nations and 
associated personnel; (6) unlawful possession or use or emplacement of weapons; (7) theft of 
nuclear materials; (8) mercenarism; (9) apartheid; (1O) slavery and slave-related practices; (II) 
torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; (12) unlawful human 
experimentation; (13) piracy; (14) aircraft hijacking and unlawful acts against international air 
safety; (15) unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation and the safety of platforms on 
the high seas; (16) threat and use of force against internationally protected persons; (17) taking 
of civilian hostages; (18) unlawful use of the mail; (19) unlawful traffic in drugs and related drug 
offenses; (20) destruction and/or theft of national treasures; (21) unlawful acts against certain 
internationally protected elements of the environment; (22) international traffic in obscene 
materials; (23) falsification and counterfeiting; (24) unlawful interference with submarine 
cables; and, (25) bribery of foreign public officials. These crimes are reflected in 323 
international instruments elaborated between 1815-1997. See BASSIOUNI, ICL 
CONVENTIONS, supra note 8. 
93. See Hague Convention, reprinted in 2, Weston, supra note 2, at II.B.l. 
94. See Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda, supra note 10. 
95. There are 35 treaties on the control of weapons. See BASSIOUNI, ICL CONVENTIONS, 
supra note 8. 
96. See BASSIOUNI, ICL CONVENTIONS, supra note 8; Hague Convention for the Protection 
of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and Regulations for the Execution of the 
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 14 May 
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1954,249 U.N.T.S. 240 (entered into force 7 Aug. 1956), reprinted in2 Weston, supra note 2, at 
II.B.15. 
97. For example, the U.S. takes the position that incendiary and laser weapons and land 
mines are not included in that category. 
98. See 3 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 76; Jordan Paust, Customary 
International Law: Its Nature, Sources and Status as Law of the United States, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 59 
(1990). See also, e.g., Meron, supra note 6; Theodor Meron, The Continuing Role of Custom in the 
Formation of International Law, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 238 (1996). 
99. See Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Additional Protocols of June 1977: 
ratifications, accessions and successions (Oct. 5, 1998), <http://www.icrc.org/unicc/icrnews>. 
See also BASSIOUNI, ICL CONVENTIONS, supra note 8, at, respectively, pp. 416-17, 426-27, 
434-35,440-41,457-60 and 486-87. This position is bolstered by the number of ratifications for 
these conventions. They are: 
The First Geneva Convention of 1949: 188 
The Second Geneva Convention of 1949: 188 
The Third Geneva Convention of 1949: 188 
The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949: 188 
Protocol I of 1977: 152 
Protocol II of 1977: 144 
See supra note 88 for the full citation to the first four Geneva Conventions. See supra note 89 for 
the citations to Protocol I and Protocol II. 
100. This was obvious in the 1997 Preparatory Committee for an International Criminal 
Court at its second and third sessions. 
101. See Geneva Conventions supra note 88, arts. 50 and 51 of the First and Second 
Convention, reprinted in 2 Weston, supra note 2, at II.B.l1-12 and arts. 130 and 147 of the 
Third and Fourth Conventions, respectively, reprinted in 2 Weston, supra note 2, at II.B.13-14; 
1977 Protocol I, supra note 89. 
102. See Common Article 3, supra note 88. 
103. See Protocol II, supra note 89. 
104. See generally LEVIE, supra note 3; Meron, supra note 6. 
105. See Conventions cited supra note 88, arts. 5 and 6. 
106. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and 
Crimes Against Humanity, opened for signature Nov. 26, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73 (entered into 
force Nov. 11, 1970), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 68, and 2 Weston, supra note 2, at II.E.16; European 
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to Crimes Against Humanity and 
War Crimes (Inter-European), Jan., 25, 1974, Europ. T.S. No. 82, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 540 
(not yet in force). See also Christine van den Wyngaert, \Var Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity 
and Statutory Limitations, in BASSIOUNI, ICL, supra note 76, at 227-239. 
107. Article 8 of the London Charter removed the defense of "obedience to superior orders." 
See London Charter, supra note 25, art. 8. Further, Article 7 of the ICfY and Article 6 of the 
ICTR both removed the defense of "obedience to superior orders" as well. See ICfY Statute, 
supra note 33, art. 7; ICTR Statute supra note 35, art. 6. For a historical evolution of the defense, 
see Leslie C. Green, SuPerior Orders and Command Responsibility, 27 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 167 
(1989); Major William H. Parks, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 MIL. L. REV. 1 
(1973). See also Leslie C. Green, The Defence of Superior Orders in the Modem Law of Armed 
Conflict, 31 ALBERTA L. REv. 320 (1993). 
108. Article 7 of the London Charter removed the defense of immunity for "head of state." 
See London Charter, supra note 25, art. 7. Further, Principle III of the "Nuremberg Principles" 
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removed the defense of immunity from heads of state. See 1950 ILC Report, supra note 27, at 
Principle III. The defense was also removed in the statutes for the ICTY and the ICTR. See ICTY 
Statute, supra note 33, at art. 7; ICTR Statute supra note 35, at art. 6. 
109. Compare Common Article 3, supra note 88, with "grave breaches" of the Third and 
Fourth Conventions, respectively Articles 130 and 147. 
110. One of the sources of international law as stated in Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court ofJustice. See Statute of the International Court ofJustice, June 26, 1945, 
59 Stat. 1055, U.N.T.S. No. 993, art.38. 
Ill. See generally Meron, supra note 6. 
112. See Bassiouni, supra note 14. See also, e.g., sources cited supra note 14. 
113. See Balint, supra note 14. See generally sources cited supra note 14 and accompanying 
text. 
114. These difficulties were evident in the work of the General Assembly's Preparatory 
Committee for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court on the Definition of War 
Crimes. See Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22, U.N. Doc. N51/22 (1996); Report of the Inter-Sessional 
Meeting From 19 to 30 Jan. 1998 in Zutphen, The Netherlands, U.N. Doc. NAC.249/1998/L.13, 
(1998); Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 
U.N. Doc. NCONF.183/2/Add.l (1998) [hereinafter PrepCom Committee]. See also the 
Commentaries of Jordan Paust in 13 NOUVELLES ETUDES PEN ALES (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed. 
1997) and 13bis NOUVELLES ETUDES PENALES (M. CherifBassiouni ed. 1998). 
115. Prosecutor II. DuSko Tadic, (IT-94-I-T), reprinted in 36 LL.M. 908. For a critical 
appraisal, see George H. Aldrich, Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslallia, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 64 (1996). 
116. Meron, supra note 7, at 238. 
117. Id. 
118. Prosecutor II. Dusko Tadic, (IT-94-I-T), reprinted in 36 LL.M. 908 (1997). See also, e.g., 
SCHARF, supra note 43. 
119.1986 ICJ Rep. 14. 
120. Meron, supra note 7, at 237. Professor Dinstein agrees that intervention by a foreign 
State on behalf of the insurgents turns a civil war into an interstate war. Specifically, with regard 
to Yugoslavia Meron writes: 
The T adic trial chamber has already accepted that, before the announced withdrawal 
ofJNA forces from the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the conflict was an international 
armed conflict. The facts of the situation and the rules of international humanitarian law 
should determine whether the JNA continued to be involved after that date and during 
the period pertinent to the indictments; if so, the international character of the conflict 
would have remained unchanged. The provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention on 
termination of the application of the Convention, including Article 6, are relevant, not 
the legal tests ofimputability and state responsibility. Finally, the appeals chamber would 
also be well-advised to abandon its adherence to the literal requirements of the definition 
of protected persons and help adapt it to the principal challenges of contemporary 
conflicts. 
Meron, supra note 7, at 242. 
121. See London Charter, supra note 25. For the proceedings before the IMT, see 
International Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg, reported in TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR 
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CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL (1949) (commonly known as 
the "Blue Series"). For the subsequent proceedings of the IMT, see TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 
BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 
(1949) (commonly known as the "Green Series"). 
122. See Special Proclamation Establishing an International Military Tribunal for the Far 
East and Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. 
No. 1589, at 3, 4 Bevans 20 (IMTFE Proclamation), reprinted in 2 \Veston, supra note 2, at 
II.E.2. On the same day General MacArthur issued his proclamation, the Charter for the IMTFE 
was adopted. Pursuant to a policy decision by the Far Eastern Commission, the Charter was later 
amended by General Order No. 20, issued by MacArthur. See Charter for the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East, Apr. 29, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589, at 11, (IMTFE Charter), 
reprinted in 2 Weston, supra note 2, at II.E.2. See generally THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL: 
THE COMPLETE TRANSCRIPTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY 
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST IN T\VENTY-T\VO VOLUMES (R. John Pritchard & Sonia 
Magbanua Zaide eds., 1981); THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL: COMPREHENSIVE INDEX AND 
GUIDE TO THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR 
EAST IN FIVE VOLUMES (R. John Pritchard & Sonia Magbanua Zaide eds., 1981); YUKI 
TANAKA, HIDDEN HORRORS: JAPANESE WAR CRIMES IN WORLD WAR II (1996). 
123. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 8. 
124. See PrepCom Committee, supra note 114. 
125. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 
U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 22, U.N. Doc. N50/22 (1995). 
126. See PrepCom Committee, supra note 114. 
127.Id. 
128. Non-paper circulated at the December 1997 session of the Preparatory Committee for 
the Establishment of an International Court, entitled Synopsis on War Crimes Relating to the 
Informal Working Paper on War Crimes (NAC.Z49/1997/wO.l/CRP.7), Dec. 3, 1997. 
129. ICC Statute, supra note l3, at art. 8, para. 2(a). 
l30. Id., para. 2(b). 
l31. Id., para 2(c). 
l32. Id. 
l33. Id., para 2(d). 
l34. The United States did not ratify either Protocol and wanted to avoid any references to 
these Protocols, insisting that whatever norms were derived therefrom should be drafted as part 
of customary law. In a sense, the United States' position is defensible because the Protocols 
essentially embody customary law and that too evidences the overlap between the two sources of 
applicable law. 
l35. See von Hebel & Robinson, supra note 52. 
l36. That approach comes from the analogy to the use of a shotgun in hunting which spreads 
pellets across a certain range and is thus more capable of having some of the pellets hit the target 
than if the weapon was a rifle with a single bullet following a single projectory. 
l3 7. It is beyond the scope of this paper to go into detail as to the different doctrines on what 
constitutes a single or multiple criminal transactions or how sentences shall be meted out. See, 
e.g., JOHN DECKER, 1 ILLINOIS CRIMINAL LAW: A SURVEY OF CRIMES AND DEFENSES § 1.19 
(3rd ed. 2000). 
l38. Report of the Preparatory Commission of the International Criminal Court, Finalized Draft of 
the Elements of Crimes, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/INF/3/Add.2 (30 June 2000) [hereinafter 
Elements ofCrimesJ. 
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139. Except in cases where lay jurors sit along with professional judges in certain cases as 
established in the applicable code of criminal procedure. The origin of such lay jury participation 
in the French legal system is the cour d' Assizes. 
140. See e.g., for the Italian system, Alfonso Stile, II Bene Giuridico. 
141. It should be noted that these legal elements also include facts. They are therefore a 
cumulation oflaw and facts. 
142. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, U.N. G.A. Res. 39/46,Feb. 4, 1985, reprinted in 23 LL.M. 1027 [Torture 
Convention). See also Daniel H. Derby, Torture, in 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra 
note 5, at 705; HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 
AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER 
CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT (1988). 
143. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Enslavement, in 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra 
note 5, at 663. 
144. Torture Convention, supra note 142. 
145. See Elements of Crimes, supra note 138. 
146. See ICC Statute, supra note 13, at Articles 77-80. 
147. See id. at Article 20. The principle ne bis in idem prevents persons from being tried before 
the Court twice for conduct that formed the basis of crimes for which the person had either been 
convicted or acquitted by the Court [Article 20(1»). Moreover, it prevents a national legal 
system of a State party from prosecuting an individual for the same conduct that formed the basis 
of a crime for which the person had previously been convicted or acquitted by the Court [Article 
20(2»). In addition, an individual, who has been either previously acquitted or convicted by a 
national court for conduct that formed the basis of crimes under the Statute, may not be 
prosecuted by the Court. [Article 20(3»). However, a conviction or acquittal by a national 
jurisdiction will not bar subsequent prosecution by the ICC if: (a) the purposes of the State 
proceedings were to "shield the person concerned from criminal responsibility" [Article 
20(3)(a»); or (b) the domestic proceedings were not conducted independently or impartially 
[Article 20(3)(b»). 
Thus, ne bis in idem only prevents a second prosecution of an accused in two circumstances: 
(1) when the first attempt was either made by the ICC, and the second effort is by either a State 
party or the ICC; or (2) when the first attempt was by a national legal system (assuming that the 
first prosecution was independent, impartial, and not for the purposes of shielding the accused 
from criminal responsibility [Article 20(3)(a)-(b))) and the second prosecution is by the Court. 
The principle is plainly only applicable when the ICC is involved, and, as such, a conviction or 
acquittal by one national legal system, while barring a second prosecution by the ICC, seemingly 
does not then bar subsequent prosecution in another national jurisdiction. 
148. IT-95-16-T Judgement ofthe Trial Chamber of 14 January 2000. 
149. [Footnote 958 in original) This result is borne out by the Appeals Chamber in its 
Decision on Jurisdiction: "Article 3 thus confers on the International Tribunal jurisdiction over 
[any) serious offence against international humanitarian law not covered by Article 2, 4 or 5: 
Article 3 is a fundamental provision laying down that any "serious violation of international 
humanitarian law" must be prosecuted by the International Tribunal. In other words, Art. 3 
functions as a residual clause designed to ensure that no serious violation of international 
humanitarian law is taken away from the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal (emphasis 
added)". See Tadic, Appeals Chamber Decision on Jurisdiction, 2 Oct. 1995, para. 91. 
150. [Footnote 959 in original) The text of Art. 48 reads as follows: 
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(1) If, by one or more acts, the perpetrator has committed more than one 
criminal offence for which he is being tried simultaneously, the court shall first determine 
the sentences for each offence and then impose a single sentence for all the offences. 
(2) The single sentence shall be imposed according to the following rules: 
i) if the death penalty was determined for one of the concurrent 
criminal offences, only that sentence shall be imposed; 
ii) if a sentence of twenty years imprisonment was determined for one 
of the concurrent criminal offences, only that sentence shall be 
imposed; 
iii) if a sentence of up to three years imprisonment were determined 
for all concurrent criminal offences, the single sentence may not 
exceed eight years of imprisonment. 
151. [Footnote 960 in original) See Art. 60 ofthe Croatian Penal Code of 1997. 
152. [Footnote 961 in original) Art. 81 of the Codice Penale reads: 
(1) Anyone who, by a single act or omission, violates different provisions of law or 
commits more than one violation of the same provision oflaw, shall be punished with the 
punishment which would be imposed for the most serious violation, increased up to no 
more than three times that sentence. [ ..• ) 
153. [Footnote 962 in original) Tadic, Sentencing Judgement, 14 July 1997, at para. 9. 
154. [Footnote 963 in original) Art. 52 reads: 
(1) If the same act violates several criminal statutes or violates the same 
statute more than once, only one punishment may be imposed. 
(2) If several criminal statutes have been violated, the punishment shall be 
determined by the statute which provides the most severe kind of punishment. It may not 
be any less severe than the other applicable statutes permit. 
155. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu (ICTR-96-4-T) (judgement), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 
1399 (1998); see also www.ictr.orglenglish/judgements/akeysu.html 
156. That same concept exists in all Romanist/CivilistiGermanic-influenced legal systems. 
157. See Elements of Crimes, supra note 138; The Diplomatic Conference provided in 
Resolution F that a Preparatory Commission be established to inter alia develop the Elements of 
Crimes in accordance with Article 9 of the ICC Statute. The Elements for war crimes contain 
significant overlaps with those for genocide and crimes against humanity. 
158. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Negotiating the Treaty of Rome on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal COlIrt, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 443, at 454: 
The Statute's omission of the material elements of crimes, or acttls rellS, creates 
another problem area. During the Conference, an article defining actus reus was dropped 
from the Statute because some delegations could not agree on its content. However, until 
the last moment, the Drafting Committee expected to receive such a provision. Lacking a 
provision on the elements of crimes, the Court will have to determine what constitutes an 
act or omission by analogy to national legal systems. However, Article 22(2) specifically 
excludes interpretation by analogy. Furthermore, Article 22(2),s prohibition on 
interpretation by analogy also conflicts with Article 31(3), which allows the Court to 
develop other grounds for exclusion from criminal responsibility. 
159. Id. 
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160. See ICC Statute, supra note 13, at Articles 77 to 79. 
161. See ICC Statute, supra note 13, at Article 20. 
162. For a distinction between humanitarian law norms and human rights law norms as 
customary law, see THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS 
CUSTOMARY LAW (1989). 
163. See Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda, supra note 10. 
164. U.S. v. Calley, C.M. 426402, 46 C.M.R. 1131 (1971); 48 C.M.R. 19 (1973); 22 C.MA 
534 (1973). 
165. U.S. v. Medina, C.MA 403; 43 C.M.R. 243 (1971). 
166.29 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 1022 (1990). 
167. Shimoda v. The State, 355 Hanrel Jiho (Supreme Court of]apan 7 December 1963); also 
quoted in part in 2 Friedman, supra note I, at 1688. See also Richard A. Falk, The Shimoda Case: 
A Legal Appraisal of the Atomic Attacks Upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 59 AM. J. INTL L. 759 
(1965). The claim in that case was against the United States of America for dropping atomic 
bombs on Nagasaki and Hiroshima in violation of the laws and customs of war. 
168. See Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann (Israel Dist. Court of Jerusalem, 1961), 36 
I.L.R. 5 (1962), (Supreme Court ofIsrael1962), 36 I.L.R. 277 (1962). See also, e.g., GIDEON 
HAUSNER, JUSTICE IN JERUSALEM (1966). 
169. See Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985), crn. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 
(1986). 
170. The Barbie judgments: 
Matter of Barbie, GAl. PAL. JUR. 710 (Cass. Crim. Oct. 6, 1983); Judgment of Oct. 6, 
1983, Cass. Crim., 1984 D.S. Jur. 113, Gaz. Pal. Nos. 352-54 (Dec. 18-20, 1983), 1983 
J.c.P. II G, No. 20,107, J.D.I. 779 (1983); Judgment of Jan. 26,1984, Casso Crim., 1984 
J.C.P. II G, No. 20,197 (Note Ruzie), J.D.I. 308 (1984); Judgment ofDec. 20, 1985, Cass. 
Crim., 1986 J.C.P. II G, No. 20,655, 1986 J.D.!.; Judgment ofJune 3, 1988, Cass. Crim., 
1988 J.C.P. II G, No. 21,149 (Report of Counselor Angevin). 
For information on the Barbie case, see generally LADISLAS DE HOYAS, KLAUS BARBIE 
(Nicholas Courtin rrans., 1985); BRENDAN MURPHY, THE BUTCHER OF LYON (1983). 
171. The Touvier judgments: ' 
Judgment of Feb. 6, 1975, Cass. Crim., 1975 D.S. Jur. 386, 387 (Report of Counselor 
Chapan), 1975 Gaz. Pal. Nos. 124-26 (May 4-6, 1975); Judgment of Oct. 27, 1975 
Chambre d'accusationde la courd'appel de Paris, 1976 D.S. Jur. 260 (Note Coste· Floret), 
1976 Gaz. Pal. Nos. 154-55, at 382; Judgment ofJune 30, 1976, Cass. Crim., 1977 D.S. 
Jur. I, 1976 Gaz. Pal. Nos. 322, 323, 1976 J.c.P. II G, No. 18,435; Judgment of Nov. 27, 
1992, Cass. Crim., 1993 J.C.P. II G, No. 21,977; Judgment of Apr. 13, 1992, Cour d'appel 
de Paris, Premiere chambre d'accusation, at 133-62, reprinted in part in 1992 Gaz. Pal. 
387,387-417; Judgment ofJune 2,1993, Cour d'appel de Versailles, Premiere chambre 
d'accusation 31. 
For information on the Touvier case, see generally ERIC CONAN & HENRY ROUSSO, VICHY, UN 
PASSE QUI NE PASSE PAS (1994); ALAIN JAKUBOWICZ & RENE RAFFIN, TOUVIER HISTOIRE 
DU PROCEs (1995); ARNO KLARSFELD, TOUVIER UN CRIME FRANCAIS (1994); JACQUES 
'fREMOLET DE VILLERS, L'AFFAlRE TOUVIER, CHRONIQUE D'UN PROCEs EN IDEOLOGIE 
(1994). 
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172. The Papon case: 
Papon was indicted on September 18, 1996; the indictment was confirmed on January 
23, 1997; Judgment of Sept. 18, 1996, Chambre d'accusation de la cour d'appel de 
Bordeaux (unpublished), affirmed Judgment ofJan. 23, 1997, Casso Crim., 1997 J.C.P. II 
G, No. 22,812. In April 1998 Maurice Papon was convicted for "crimes against humanity" 
and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. See Craig R. Whitney, Ex-Vichy Aide Is 
Convicted and Reaction Ranges Wide, N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 3,1998, atA1; Craig R. Whitney, 
Vichy Official Found Guilty of Helping Deport Jews, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1998, at A8; and 
Charles Trueheart, Verdict Nears in Trial of Vichy Official, WASH. POSf, Apr. I, 1998, at 
A21. 
For information on the Papon case, see generally Laurent Greilsamer, Maurice Papon, la lIie 
masquee, LE MONDE, Dec. 19, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Monde File; Barry James, 
The Final Trial for Vichy? A Model French Bureaucrat Accused, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 6-7, 
1996, at 2. 
For additional information on these cases and French prosecution of war criminals in 
general, see generally Leila Sadat \Y/ exler, National Prosecutions for International Crimes: The 
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